Notes on new data on "undercurrents": Working Annotated Bibliography*
*Indicates "work in progress" in research; or work referred to by secondary source.
Part I : Tim and Me
Synchronicity:
Websites:
http://www.trufax.org/cnet/synch.html
Takes to screen that has an essay. Follow main headings: "Consciousness Network Ongoing Research on the Subject of Synchronicity- Return to CNET Main Menu"
--will then get this essay/statement:
"The term "synchronicity" is otherwise viewed as the term "coincidence"
by those who do not find themselves perceptually within its flow. With
the basic frequency of the environment of the universe increasing, the
concept of synchronicity is very important, because the ongoing
perception of it is a "marker" of the relationship between your
consciousness and the subjective reality you perceive. As most of you
have no doubt noticed, the rate and perception of synchronicity is
increasing, as is the perception that the linear time flow is speeding
up.
"Perhaps the best overall composite commentary on synchronicity that we
have so-far seen is as follows:
" 'Synchronicity is the conscious perception in a physiological time
track of the simultaneous manifestation of the multi-dimensional
universe. It is the conscious recognition that all events, objects,
relationships, points of view, perceptions and interactions are ONE
thing viewed from different perspectives. As the basic resonant
vibration of the system increases, synchronicity becomes more easily
perceptible within experiential reality. Synchronicity is also a
reflection of what you believe you reality to be. Synchronicity,
relative to reality, IS what reality IS, and it is the WAY it is.
"Now, many people have discussed the subject of synchronicity, all the
way from Carl Jung to Bashar. However, it is from Bashar, representing
the Essassani, that we get further clarification:
" 'Recognize that you are all functioning completely within
synchronicity, but many of you choose to function within negative
synchronicity, choosing a perception of a negative reality, rather than
positive synchronicity and a positive perception of reality. Should you
choose a negative reality, than those situtations will be negative
reflections.'"
Other points on the Website give clarifications of who "Essassani" is/are.( I don't propose any specific religious philosophy, just trying to find the Truth (capital T), I wouldn't want to bog the reader down or give a false impression as to my knowledge in this area of "religious truth.")
I do think I like the idea of "focusing" on positive rather than negative coincidences/synchronicity. "Many of you choose to function within negative synchronicity, rather than positive synchronicity and a positive perception of reality."
That's quite a thought. I wonder if, in the process of NOTICING or taking note of the various coincidences that go on in our day-to-day lives, if we also focused only on positive or "growth" oriented coincidences, we might be better off, than if we focus on "negative" or bad or sad memory types of coincidences.
What is bringing this to my mind, is how the dates of Tim's and Dad's deaths, (my brother died around June 15, 1995, approximately the time of Bush's first crash; my father died Sept. 2, 1998, the exact date of Bush's second crash) "correlate" with the dates in Bush's life in 1944: would that be an example of a "negative" coincidence or synchronicity? It brings up a lot of negative or sad memories or thoughts: the events in Bush's life on those dates weren't pleasant either; could it be that my association of that fact with those dates, helped to create a "climate" in my own life, such that it "attracted" further negative things for those dates?
I'm speculating here, trying to think something out. This wouldn't necessarily have to involve any "spiritual" principle--perhaps this is something electromagnetic in nature--that is, seemingly spiritual in a way, but having a physical explanation.
Similar in principle, perhaps, to the "positron" physicists now talk about as a possible physical explanation of the "glimpse of the future" we sometimes seem to get: as particles move backward rather than forward in time, and that maybe that is what causes "precognition." It wouldn't be anything spiritual, then, but actually something quite physical, in reality. That being the case, like Jack '0' lantern, will 'o' wisp, St. Elmo's Fire, etc., it could seem weird, and not exactly be an everyday occurrence, yet still be essentially physical in nature.
I can't help but wonder about things like Ouija boards in this regard, too. People really do seem to have glimpses of the future. But that could be this positron business, again, just in another setting. Maxwell Maltz has written several books in which he gives examples of how "focusing" our thoughts can cause things to be more likely to come into our lives. He even says anxieties can tend to become reality, if we're picturing something we are nervous about, it tends to happen, because of a principle similar to magnetism.
Similarly, it could be that the Ouija board user, if using it repeatedly, forms a certain "image" that they'll be able to see the future. Over time, that image, since it is mental and therefore involves electricity (the brain/nerve system operates on electrical principles--"synapse" and all), could also have an electromagnetic quality. Maltz says if you're afraid something will happen, you increase its likelihood to happen if you continue to picture it; switch to a different image.
Books: Bolen, Jean Shinoda. The Tao of Psychology: Synchronicity and the Self. San Francisco:
Harper and Row, 1982. 75-80; 82-5. Insightful analysis of some aspects of Synchronicity and Jung, though some events chronicled were subsequently discredited.
Koestler, Arthur. Postcript Renee Haynes. The Roots of Coincidence. New York: Random House, 1972. 61-8; 72; 77; 85-7; 111-113; 118-119. esp. "orderly behavior" of metals under some stresses, repeated "disorderly" behavior of metals under different stresses. Though author's views have sometimes been controversial, material in this book is somewhat credible scientifically.
Progoff, Ira. Jung, Synchronicity, and Human Destiny: Noncausal Dimensions of Human Experience. New York: Delta, 1973. 131-6; 140-44; 147-8; 151-7. Insightful, unique look at Jung, too Eastern philosophy-oriented to be credibly scientific.
Zukav, Gary. The Dancing Wu-Li Masters: An Overview of the New Physics. New York: William Morrow, 1979. 85-8; 212-215; 228-9; 313-15. Especially impressive is Zukav's recount of scientific data on the behavior of photons and postulated "positrons." Credibly scientific.
UFOs: There is a more cynical view on UFOs than is offered in my main text (with high-quality research to back it). Thus, I prefer to write of "encounters," rather than UFOs.
Berlitz, Charles and William L. Moore. The Roswell Incident. NY: Grosett and Dunlap, 1980. 16, 17-20; 21-22; 24; 26; 27; 32-33; 35-38; 40; 63-70; 86-7; 89-90; 104-7; 122; 133-4; 135-6; 141. One of the better researched "believer" books on UFOs.
Bryan, CDB. Close Encounters of the Fourth Kind. New York: Knopf, 1995. 49-50; 133- 9; 142-5, esp. 145; 161-2 ("No" African cases? Recall Dogon of Mali fn); 266-76.
Klass, Philip. UFOs Explained. New York: Random House, 1975. (e.g., of several texts).Experienced researcher and skeptic, Klass attacks all "classic" UFOs, including the "Trent photos" of 1950. (See, e.g., 178). Tour de force on general UFO skepticism.
Korff, Kal K. The Roswell UFO Crash: What They Don't Want You to Know. New York: Prometheus, 1997. 44-6; 46-8; 56-7; 58-68; 74; 76-8; 78-81; 82-6; 86-91; 91-2; 92-3; 95-9; 103-4; 124; 125-6; 128-30; 134-7; 165-8; 176-185; 193; 199;.225-6; 227-9. Probably the best researched "skeptic" book on Roswell, "expert" UFOlogy
Saler, Benson, Charles A Ziegler and Charles B. Moore. UFO Crash at Roswell: The Genesis of a Modern Myth. Washington, DC: Smithsonian, 1997.13-17; 22-5; 26- 9; 44-5; 58-60; 74; 76-89; 78-9,Table 1; 108-14; 170-8; 182 n.3, 4.
Other things:
Mirsky, Jonathan. "Mission Impossible: An Account of the CIA's Secret Operations in Tibet." Rev. of Orphans of the Cold War: America and the Tibetan Struggle For Survival. by John Kenneth Knaus. (New York: Public Affairs, 1999). New York Times Book Review July 18, 1999. 29. Interesting perspective on CIA and the seeming semi-obsession which Allen Dulles had for "holding" Tibet. Raises interesting questions about whether Dulles had input from some of the Nazis he'd "rescued" about possible German "travel agents" (see Part II) having an inside track on "ET" materials or writings from ancient Tibet, as some, such as D. Hatcher Childress, (whom we noted in Part I), have claimed they did.
Notes on new data on Bush: Working Annotated Bibliography, Part II
ABC News. "20/20 Monday". KATV, Little Rock, AR. Nov. 3, 1999. Well, my dad would be extremely unhappy right now. He liked George Bush agreat deal, and didn't have the doubts about him that I've been forced by events and research to have. George Bush was in tears on nationwide television tonight. Specifically, Sam Donaldson of interviewed him, examining "another side of George Bush"--that freed-up side he's felt more free to show since retirement from public life. He's a writer of letters and e-mails.
Donaldson says that a reading of Bush's letters reveals him to be a man who isn't vindictive by nature. This may seem somewhat at odds with Bush's earlier behavior in relation to some who've worked with him, such Reagan Administration Secretary of State (in the first two years) Alexander Haig. Haig generally has given the impression that he feared a vindictive side of George Bush (at least, according to Tarpley and Chaitkin).
However, this seeming contradiction would be in fitting with what I perceived about George Bush and described in "Conclusions: Guilty or Innocent, or Can It Be That Simple?" that one of the reasons Bush ordered US military personnel into Somalia for that humanitarian effort in the last days of his administration (after he'd already been defeated in the 1992 Presidential electiion), was that, as a retiree, he was at last free from family's, family friends', CIA's and "the company's" (that is, Standard Oil's) entanglements, machinations and intrigues. Those continuing episodes and the unending need for cover-ups, follow-ups and the like were finally over for him.
George Bush did a great deal that he did, in his life, as a part of protecting that "family name." He also had to "cover" for a number of shifty characters with unsavory political views. Ironically, in losing "official" power, he gained personal, private power over his own life.
There are many and complex layers to this man. Those layers are among the "undercurrents in all our lives."
Abrams, Herbert L. "The President Has Been Shot": Confusion, Disability, and the Twenty-fifth Amendment in the Aftermath of the Attempted Assassination of Ronald Reagan. New York: Norton, 1992. 92-7; 110-121. Further mention of the perceived "argument" between Haig and Weinberger that day; Haig's "I'm in control here" statement; photos of the sequence of events.
Akashi, Yoji. "Japanese Military Administration in Malaya--Its Formation and Evolution
in Reference to Sultans, the Islamic Religion, and the Moslem-Malays, 1941- 1945." Asian Studies. 7 (1) Apr. 1969. Quezon City, Philippines: Institute of Asian Studies, Univ. of Philippines. 81-110. In Note 13, Halliday says: "A valuable text on this is Yoji Akashi, 'Japanese Military Administration in Malaya and the Moslem Malays,1941-45,' Asian Studies, (Manila), Vol. 7, No. 1 (April 1969).Akashi points out that Harry Miller's standard biography of the Tengku completely glosses over all this. When premier, the Tengku invited Kubata shun, the wartime (1942-43) Japanese governor of Perak, back to Malaya, in 1960; and during his state visit to Japan in 1963, held a reception in Tokyo for the Japanese who had participated in the Malaya Military Administration. . ."
Alfange, Dean. The Case Against Dewey. (S. L.): Alfange, 1944. Makes the case that Dewey, et al, were allied with the Far Right, including on some foreign policy issues.
Anderson, Scott, and Jon Lee Anderson. Inside the League: The Shocking Exposé of How Terrorists, Nazis, and Latin American Death Squads have Infiltrated the World Anti-Communist League. New York: Dodd, Mead, 1986. 32-45 (esp. 36-7); 111. On page 228 of my manuscript, there is a two-paragraph quote in mid-page from Russ Bellant's book Old Nazis, the New Right and the Republican Party, which includes a reference to Bush's ties to Stanislaw Stankievich, mayor of Borrisow in 1941 who exterminated Jews and others and freed up Nazi troops from such "administrative" duties on the Eastern Front to fight US and British forces in Europe, resulting in greater US casualties and a longer war.
Bellant's text simply noted that "The 1985 Republican Heritage Groups Council convention delegation...included Raisa Stankievich, wife of Stanislaw...(Bellant 11-12)." Bellant merely noted that Stankievich's wife was there, and didn't go into details as to why. I about halfway got the impression Stankievich was dead at the time.
He wasn't. He was very much alive--and very much had been INVITED to attend the GOP function, into which George Bush had a great deal of input and over which George Bush had a great deal of control. This is brought out clearly in Inside the League, an exposé about the World Anti-Communist League and the constant dealing with these Nazi "sympathizer" types that is most surprising, in many ways, about the post-War behavior of George Bush, a WW2 veteran. This business of Laslo Pasztor is also intriguing and so is this new stuff about the Bulgarian Legion people. Rumania was where Standard was really interested, though. I've just been recalling some information I read some years ago, and am re-evaluating it in light some of the newer information I've found. These footnotes in David Bergamini and others about how the Japanese had found "connections" in Bulgaria by 1943 got me intrigued. Then, I suddenly flashed back, after reading Inside the League by Anderson and Anderson, to Russ Bellant's Old Nazis, the New Right and the Republican Party.
There, in Bellant's text, is a reference to one Alexander Ronnett, a Chicagoan and a regular at Reagan NSC meetings. A Chicago TV station interviewed this former Rumanian Nazi about his frequent participation at those meetings, given his former "bad security" rating at the end of WW2.
On top of that, Inside the League refers to Ronnett as a "connecting point" between the Bulgarian Fascists, known as the Bulgarian Legion, and his own Rumanian Fascists, and describes how he and "George Paprikoff, who had belonged to the pro-Nazi Bulgarian Legionary movement", and fellow Chicago fascists, traveled to a joint session of the Illinois state congress and met with Governor Jim Thompson in private. In July, about a year later, Reagan himself met with these folks, or their companero Yaroslav Stesko "whose followers assisted in the slaughter of Jews in the Ukraine", and Bush signed a photograph: "To the Honorable Yaroslav Stesko, with Best Wishes, George Bush." Stesko, as mayor of Ukrainian townships in 1941, had rounded up the Jews into a ghetto and blackmailed them with the threat of murder. After extorting thousands to millions from them, he had his forces move in and murder those thousands of Jews.
He had also participated in the murder of Polish officials who had committed the dastardly offense of spying for the Allies--an act which at least theoretically made the world a little safer for the likes of WW2 military personnel in the field like George Bush. For those murders, he had gone to prison. And did George resent him for his murder of his wartime helpers, those Polish officials? NO--now he was honored by the President and VP.
Attiwill, Kenneth. The Singapore Story. London: Muller, 1959. 126 [referred to in Note 11; also, from note 14 in Jon Halliday Political History of Japanese Capitalism, 363:] The British administration "were more interested in pleasing London by getting maximum production of Malayan rubber and tin than they were in defending Malaya. . .The Governor and his masters in London seemed more afraid of arming the Malayan Asiatics than they were of the menacing Japanese (136)."
Behr, Edward. Hirohito: Behind the Myth. New York: Vintage, 1990. 237-9; 269-71; 272-81; 345-53; 377-79. Useful insights into the Japanese intrigues of summer, 1944. This proves especially valuable alongside another unexpectedly productive source, David Bergamini's Japan's Imperial Conspiracy (cited in more detail below). One important insight gained from Bergamini's detailed and careful analysis of a wide array of sources, including those in Japanese, (which he and Behr have spared me the time and trouble of translating), is the major difference in approach of Emperor Hirohito of Japan to negotiations with the West versus that of Hitler.
In order to open a diplomatic offensive with the West, Germans were forced repeatedly to have to find some way to literally do away with Hitler. His intransigent position on negotiations left no alternative. Negotiation, said Hitler, was treason---as he so vociferously had argued in his taking
power, when one of his key arguments that had roused wishful-thinking-based German ire had been that Germany's WW1 forces had been "defeated at the peace table, not on the battlefield".
Not so clear-cut at all was Hirohito's position. As Bergamini makes clear time and again, Hirohito backed numerous "peace feelers" right up to the end of the War. Finally concluding the cause was lost in the wake of Chief of Staff Sugiyama's bleak report to him on the overall Pacific War situation of August 1943, Hirohito commissioned one more definitive, exhaustive study by his military of any military options left. This, according to Bergamini and his sources (990), was "completed by the end of the year" and were even "more bleak than Sugiyama's preliminary findings (Bergamini 991)."
Thereafter, Hirohito was active in commissioning peace talks, peace feelers and all kind so machinations to achieve some negotiated settlement with Chiang, Britain and the US, including using Bulgarian and Russian contacts (Bergamini 991).
On page 994, however, Bergamini brings clearly to the readers' awarenessthe vast difference in approach between the Hitler regime and that of Hirohito as to peace negotiators. Involved in all kinds of ostensibly "unofficial" peace groups himself, the Emperor had a Right-winger named
Nakano Seigo done away with when the latter attempted to break up what he was interpreting as unauthorized peace planning in the Court by October 27, 1943. Though this Right-winger's group plotted to assassinate Lord Privy Seal Kido and even Tojo for their by-then-revealed peace plans, Hirohito would have none of this (since he himself was in on it!). Instead of killing the "peace mongers" as was regularly done in Hitler's Germany at that time, Hirohito, instead, did away with the hawks. (In contrast, in the same time-frame, Hitler was killing the doves.)
A number of other instances cited in Bergamini's text and notes strongly reinforce the notion that both Hirohito and Tojo were actively pursuing peace negotiations with the West by mid-1944.
Bergamini, David. Japan's Imperial Conspiracy. NewYork: William Morrow, 1971. xxxiii; 72; 727-29; 840-1; 853-6; 884-7; 905; 907-11; 913-16; 920; 934-9; 944-7; 959; 960-3; 966-73 982-6; 989-991[fn] (refers to Japan's "Bulgarian contact" with America of 1943--would be interesting if this found to connect to Ivan Docheff of WACL fame); 992; 993; 994; 996; 997; 1004-9; 1012-14; 1048fn;Glossary section, pgs: 1103-4, where Bergamini says Masanobu disappeared "while visiting Hanoi".
This one source, about Japan, has several interesting things in it, just from the quick and admittedly excited browsing I've done already.
There's a reference to some State Department documents, reference to
Japanese contacts with the OSS in Switzerland. That was Allen Dulles's base when he was a station chief for the OSS. Extremely intriguing and further confirmation of the material such as Tarpley and Chaitkin, Charles Higham, and Loftus and Aarons, among others, have unearthed about Dulles. also refers to how Hirohito made speeches in 1941, shortly after Pearl Harbor, in which he talked about Japan's "friends in American capital" and there are direct references to the documents that those speeches are in. I'm still looking through it for more about those letters between Dulles and the Japanese who he got off the hook for war crimes, and back into the Japanese gov't in 1945-7. The "Chapter Notes" in this book are among the best I've seen. Maybe it's because I'm far along with this, far along enough with the research to recognize the significance, now, of specific references of a certain types. In A Political History of Japanese Capitalism by Jon Halliday (NY: Random House/Pantheon, 1975), in this case, the chapter notes for "Pages 143-144", which appear on page 363-4 of the book, (note 15), make the following reference:"...It is extremely illuminating to read Masanabu Tsuji, Singapore: The Japanese Version (London, Constable and Co., 1962), which contains in an appendix the text of a Japanese booklet on fighting in Southeast Asia, with political indications on the struggle against European imperialisms. See also Saburo Hayashi (in collaboration with Alvin D. Coox), Kogun: The Japanese Army in the Pacific War (Quantico, Va., Marine Corps Association, 1959).
"Tsuji Masanobu was probably the most brilliant strategist in the Imperial Army and played a key role in planning victories in China, the Philippines and Singapore. At the end of the war he evaded capture [my emphases--mcs] and after several years returned to Japan. There, although listed by the British as a war criminal, he was not charged with war crimes [emphasis added]; he later became a member of the Diet, joining the ruling Liberal Democratic Party. He disappeared just outside Vientiane, Laos, in 1961, and speculation about his whereabous has continued rife to this day. Brief biography in I. I. Morris, Nationalism and the Right Wing in Japan: A Study of Post-War Trends (London, Oxford University Press, 1960), pp. 450-51; cf Bergamini, Japan's Imperial Conspiracy."
That's just one of several interesting little bits and pieces I've already run across in this book. However, as Loftus and Aarons pointed out in the section of their book, there are still other sources. One is the "Nationalism and the Right Wing In Japan" referred to in the quote above.
An interesting point addressed here, is how the first US bombing raid against Japan by B-29s, referred to by Stinnett (47): "The first B-29 raid on Japan took place on June 15, 1944, bombing the island of Kyushu but did little damage. These Superfortresses of the US Army Air Force were based in Chengtu, China." Bergamini (1008) gives somewhat more detail, explaining why such bombing from such a location was not really a threat to Japan proper: "The very day of the Saipan landing, B-29s from bases deep in China gave a small demonstration of what lay in store by strking a glancing blow at factories in Kyushu, the southernmost of Japan's home islands. This raid marked the beginning of the bombing of Japan, and Hirohito was quick to realize that, if Saipan fell, bombing of Japan would become routine..." We note here that these were lightly-loaded aircraft, barely hitting the southernmost of Japan's home islands, and having to be extra-heavily-laden with fuel--and therefore bereft of most bombs and even much ammunition--to do so. Hence, the bases remaining to the US in China that had not be captured by the Japanese during the Ichigo offensive earlier in 1944, were not really satisfactory. The Japanese, merely by moving their arms and factories north of Kyushu, could totally avoid US bombs from central China. This reinforces yet again the extreme importance of the capture of Saipan, and why the "balking" troops reported by Hoyt during campaign (200-19) for Saipan were so strategically placed from Dulles's perspective--and is why their officers' ties to Dulles's firms are so suspect here. After all, Dulles, as a bigwig at OSS, would know how to communicate with these men by mail in a way that would avoid the US censors. These strategically located officers, refusing to order their men forward, were not only delaying the capture of Saipan, they were delaying the US bombing of the Japanese home islands. Given the "summer of 1944" US State-Navy-War joint committee's approval of a paper advocated an arranged surrender of Japan, cited by Herbert L. Feis in Japan Subdued (see full reference under Feis's name later in this Annotated Bibliography), we should not wonder that Forrestal and Dulles were aided in their efforts to secretly and illegally arrange a negotiated peace with Japan. These "balking" officers were ultimately removed from their command positions on Saipan and their men then went on, under other commanding officers, to do a more satisfactory job. This all occurred, however, be it noted, while Dulles was still trying to arrange the negotiated settlement with the Axis, including the assassination of Hitler. When the latter failed, by July 20, 1944, the whole package essentially collapsed as a potential political bombshell to deliver to GOP Presidential candidate Dewey. It may be that Dewey himself didn't know about the scheme; however, it's interesting to note that, during Watergate, Nixon taped himself during "crisis control" as saying "Bring in George Bush. He'll do anything for our cause." Aside from the paranoid "our cause," what did Nixon mean by "anything"? Up until that time, George Bush had done nothing especially spectacular--officially at least--for the GOP, having only run for an office in Texas and attended to the relatively routine functions of a number of routine-sounding appointed positions. Therefore, this quote from Nixon is intriguing, indeed. Does it refer to some insider knowledge of Bush's derring-do during World War II, when he may have risked life and limb to try to help Dulles arrange that 1944 version of an "October surprise"?
Bose, Subhas Chandra. Testament of Subhas Chandra Bose. Delhi: 1946 (microfilm).v- vi; 69-76, 223-229; 235; 239; 257; 265- 267; 273, 275. Direct excerpts from telegrams, letters, and radio speeches by Bose for the Axis .There are also a couple of other new sources. And of course, older sources Secret War Against the Jews by Loftus and Aarons (NY: St. Martin's, 1994); Charles Higham's Trading with the Enemy (NY: Delacorte, 1983); Christopher Simpson's Blowback (NY: Delacorte:1988); and R. Harris Smith's OSS: The Secret History of America's First Intelligence Agency (Berkeley, CA: UP, 1988). A list of interesting dates and events, in more or less sequence:
June 19, 1944: Bush "out of pocket" or odd records, off Marianas
June, 1944: Allen Dulles, OSS Switz. station chief, working w/ Axis to negotate a settlement behind FDR's back, begins using couriers; sets up connection with Vatican to use its couriers, which include Knights of Malta.
April -August 1944--Japanese offensives in N. China ("Ichigo"), highly successful due to Chiang's treason against his own generals.
April-late July, 1944--Japanese offensives in Burma-India border area,early successes, (through mid-June). Japanese forces, with help from the"INA" (Indian National Army, a group of Indian Army defectors), actually occupies section of India, even this late in the war.
1944--"Fake" Japanese priests replace "standard" priests on Japanese-held Guam; George R. Tweed, USN, and guerilla on Guam, evades capture, but only
narrowly due to one of these priest's complicity w/Japanese occupation forces. Clearly reveals a pro-Axis sympathy on the part of these "clergy."
Now: here's the new stuff:
February 22, 1944: Gandhi wife, aide die in British prison; Gandhi and his closest followers have been detained by the British for months, due to his activity to gain Indian independence;
May 6, 1944--Gandhi released from prison permanently. British are afraid he might die, since he is in poor health.
February 22, 1944--Bose, Axis propagandist and INA leader, makes speech bemoaning death of Gandhi associate.
(October 23: Japan gives control of Indian offshore Andaman and Nicobar Islands to INA; October 25, INA, already at war w/Russia, declares war on US, Britain).
March, 1944--Bose visits Burma
June 20, 1944--Bose sends telegram to Adolf Hitler.
July 7, 1944--Bose makes a speech on radio about how, in the intervening weeks since February 22, he has visited, among other places, the newly "independent" and ruled by INA, Andaman and Nicobar Islands. In this speech, he comments that he has been "following" Gandhi's state of health for "several weeks" since Gandhi's release from British prison in India. Talks of how there are "friends of Indian independence" in US and Britain.
July 9, 1944--Bose makes another speech, rebroadcast and reprinted/reworded at least twice by the Japanese, in which he says the INA has "learned" from its recent failed offensive into India. Among other things, he says he has been "heartened" to learn that "enemy soldiers can come over to our side" and that arrangements must be made to increase this. In the July 7 speech, he'd indicated a sense of disbelief that the "friends of Indian" independence had much influence; now, his whole mood is more upbeat; he is now, he says, "broadcasting from Rangoon", rather than Singapore--a move in the direction of India. Further, he says, he and his allies the Japanese have "captured enemy documents".
Tojo resigned, June 21.
The Schellenberg plot to kill Hitler, June 20, 1944 (working, we now know, with Dulles, due to his attempt to kill Hitler and replace him with a new government with which he could negotiate his illegal settlement with the Axis; and, again, all the wheeling and dealing he was doing with the Axis via Vatican couriers, including some Knights of Malta and Red Cross couriers; those fake "priests" on Guam become interesting, as does the fact that Standard Oil VP Richard Larkin was a Knight of Malta, and an associate of Allen Dulles, who was Prescott Bush's attorneythroughout the War and afterward.
So--all these dates match up. The "independent" Andaman /Nicobar Islands were of interest, since they'd declared war on Russia first, before they ever did on US and Britain, via their INA rulers. Now, in March to June, 1944, there is Bose, topnotch diplomat and spokesman for the Axis and the INA, "go between" par excellence, right in the time-frame when such "neutral"places would have been useful stopover points for a Standard Oil tanker out of "neutral" Saudi Arabia, through the Persian Gulf, Indian Ocean, to the "neutral" Nicobars, then on to "neutral" Thailand, where it could be unloaded by Japanese work crews and its cargo delivered into either Burma or Malaya.
This whole thing, just looks increasingly likely all the time. Thomas Dewey has chosen, as of summer 1944, as his VP running-mate against FDR in the upcoming 1944 Pres. election John Bricker, ultra-right wing candidate, favorite of the Isolationist "America First" party and leading anti-Semite, Gerald L.K. Smith (who was investigated by the FBI for his Nazi-entertaining activities during the War). Perhaps Dewey was never apprised of Dulles/Forrestal/Standard Oil's efforts to arrange this diplomatic coup for him to be dumped into his lap during the '44 campaign, could it have been worked out.
These were some busy little bees! So much for the myth that there were no "negotiations" with the enemy during World War 2! Despite FDR's official line, it's clear that there were all kinds of folks engaged in under-the-table talks, and totally without his sanction. All kinds of couriers running around for the Axis during the summer of '44, too. Fake Bishop "Cikota" sent by Dulles and the Vatican to Japanese-occupied
Manchuria with tons of Dulles illegal money from the Third Reich. Vatican couriers carrying messages to the Germans about US troop movements; Dulles warning the Germans not to use radios, thereby alerting them and allowing them to surprise Allied forces at the Battle of the Bulge (which was such a surprise to us because there were no radio intercepts of the German plans for that counteroffensive).
A key difference between Reagan and Bush here was that, in 1944, Reagan was a Democrat. He
had no involvement in this stuff. But, if my thinking is more or less correct here, Bush would
have been blown out of the water politically, by its exposure. No wonder he got rid of Haig in the
wake of Reagan's shooting and hospitalization by Hinckley, a man whom Tarpley and Chaitkin
note had some interesting possible connections with US intelligence (via his father) and with the
Bush family itself had ties (first stated, then denied by Bush family and in-laws shortly after the
Reagan shooting.
Bowen, Russell S. The Immaculate Deception: The Bush Crime Family Exposed. Carson City, NV: America West, 1991. 165-6: Newly-significant data on how Dukakis campaign was "set up" by a group of Florida and Illinois bankers to get BCCI money--which was then "investigated" by Reagan/Bush Administration/operatives, who were actually even more deeply involved, in order to cut off funding for Dukakis TV ads in last weeks of 1988 after the Columbus Day "raid." Bowen also reveals, (76-80) in his section on the "October Surprise", an "update" on the supposed discrediting of the theory via the "discovery" of credit card receipts of Richard Brenneke during the time frame when he claimed to be flying to Paris meetings with the Iranians. Subsequent investigation by Barbara Honneggar (author of October Surprise. NY: Tudor, 1989) invalidated the claim these were Brenneke's credit card receipts when Franke Snepp, the reporter, was unwilling to produce them for examination. In addition, Bowen lists the several contradictory stories Bush, et al, have given as to where he was that weekend of October 19, 1980:
1. at a suburban country club outside Washington, DC (based on heavily-censored Secret Service records showing where Bush's Secret Service entourage stayed, obtained by PBS TV's Frontline program and which make no mention of Bush);
2. at home writing a speech, giving it, then returning at 9 p.m. (according to a Washington Times story);
3. had lunch with Supreme Court Justice Potter Steward and his wife (according to the Wall Street Journal's L. Gordon Crovitz).
Like Bush's varying versions of events in World War II, (Chi Chi Jima: was his plane on fire or not? were there Japanese planes in the air or not? were both crewmen already dead when he bailed out, or did one try to bail out, too? was his the only chute that opened? what angle did he dive from? These details can be important in trying to determine if Bush is distorting his activity over Chi Chi Jima in order to cover up the fact that he didn't know how to water land an aircraft and never had, as he alleges he did off Guam. Guam/Marianas: what ships were involved in his rescue? how many? how long was he gone? was he picked up separately from Delaney?) Bush, his apologists and his biographers give varying accounts on so many important points. Why does no one know?
Bower, Tom. Maxwell the Outsider. New York: 1992, Viking. xiii-xv; 274-83; 343-6; 442-3; 460-65; 470-507. Interesting data on Maxwell's body and the state in which it was found; also interesting correlation of dates of some of Maxwell's buyouts and activities and the ongoing political climates at the times.
---------. Maxwell, the Final Verdict. New York: 1996. 1-8;. 301-7; 310-13; 316-21; 323-4; 343-6; 363-74. More interesting data on Maxwell's death and his many ties to world intelligence communities. More interesting dates and events that correlate well with the political pressures Bush would be under during various election years.
In the case of both of these books, Bower comes across as perhaps a bit too tough on Maxwell (he goes into too much gory detail in describing the 1991 autopsy, isn't at all sensitive in his treatment of the widow Betty and daughter Ghislaine during the 1991 funeral arrangements, virtually accuses his sons of being incompetents in Outsider, then backtracks on this charge in order to further insult Maxwell by implying he was "unfair" to his sons in Final Verdict). Maxwell, his attorneys and sons all attempted to keep Bower's books from publication; they were only successful in Britain itself, which has somewhat "different" libel laws.
This in itself, however, may reveal that Maxwell had experienced some degree of pre-publication harassment himself and was attempting to apply the same methods to his own critics. 1987: going into the 1988 Presidential election, Maxwell is attempting to buy out the Daily News. That publication folded, but not immediately. There was still some potential for an exposé to run there. By 1988, he was trying, unsuccessfully, to buy into American publishers HBJ and New York Post.
Brown, Judith M. Gandhi: Prisoner of Hope. New Haven, CT: Yale UP, 1989. 343-6. General info. about Gandhi, esp. his 1944 activities while Bose was active in INA in Burma and the Andaman Islands.
Butow, Robert J. C. Japan's Decision to Surrender. Hoover Library Pub. 24. Stanford, CA: Stanford UP, 1954. 20-21; 26-27.51-54.
Corr, Gerald H. War of the Springing Tigers. London: Osprey, 1975. The "springing tiger" was the logo of the Indian National Army--a group of defectors fighting alongside Japan against Britain on the theory that Japan would be a reliable ally in gaining Indian independence from a defeated Britain.
They were highly-successful in getting tens of thousands of Indian troops to defect to their movement during the Malaya-Singapore campaign early in the War (December 1941-February 1942: a key reason Singapore/Malaya fell to the Japanese was the defection of many of the Indian troops; nationalism had been stifled pretty severely in India by the British, so Indian soldier morale in the Brit. army was very low). The book and some of the other sources reveal this relatively little-known fact as a key reason for theBritish defeat--a defeat, it might be noted, of monumental proportions,since a British/Indian army of several times the size of the Japanese forcefighting against it, surrendered at Singapore. One of the myths of thoseearly days of the war was that the Japanese succeeded due to surprise, large numbers, etc. Clearly not the case: at least in this campaign(perhaps unlike the Philippines), they succeeded because the Indian"boys"--who were quite brave soldiers--finally refused to fight alongsidethe now-apparent as arrogant British. Numerous things the British officersdid in their treatment of the up to then hard-fighting Indian troops led to the virtual mutiny by tens of thousand of Indian troops. Between 50 and 70,000 Indian soldiers joined the INA, which means they started fighting with, instead of against, Japan.
Anyway, this early success led the INA to think that, when the Arakan and Imphal-Kohima campaigns started in February and March, 1944, they'd be able to bring over thousands more Indian troops from the Indian-Burma border area, and finally from within India itself.
The interesting material here, covers pages 149-164. That entire section is interspersed with odd bits and pieces of information about Bose's activities, when he was here and there, what he said and did, what the Japanese, including Premier Tojo, did and said, planned, etc. Also useful to this, is the fact that part of this Japanese/Indian defector army assault on India itself from the Burma border area began February 4, 1944, and lasted, in one small area, until September 1944. It isn't the real military situation we're dealing with here. It is the mindset, the mental delusions or excess hopefulness, of Japanese generals and politicos, and various Indian nationalists desperate for success, and determined to "see" it even when it didn't exist.
Arakan offensive and Imphal/Kohima campaigns were a disaster for the Japanese after a few months. But, starting out successfully, they got the Indian nationalists and their soldiers all hoped up. They were the last to give up on it. Why? Because it got them back into India itself. The Japanese got into India--got Indian nationalist troops inside the India border. They weren't large in number, but they refused to leave when the Japanese started to withdraw from the offensives due to building British/American/Indian forces. They had driven into the area quite rapidly, partly due to surprise, camouflage, etc. And, early on, in February, a number of Indian troops went over, after being captured or isolated from the British--also initially surprised and captured in quite large numbers.
They drove on, reaching the Indian border, avoiding British air patrols, then began to slow down, and of course, growing British and American air strength finally did the trick, as air supplies came to the men on their side on the ground, whereas the Japanese and Indian nationalists increasingly found their supplies exhausted, their lines of supply overextended. However, one group of Indian nationalist troops captured an area called Mowdok in India itself. The rest of the campaign ground to a halt, the Japanese taking heavier casualties, and, even with their fanatic style, finally withdrawing back into Burma under British/Indian/American pressure.
By July 9, 1944, even Tokyo grudgingly allowed the starving troops without resupply to withdraw to more reasonable areas further back in Burma. But those Indian nationalist troops stayed in Mowdok, India, until September, 1944. For them, it was a whole different issue. Once free from direct ties to the Japanese army, and back home there in India, their blood was up. All the years of injustice under Britain kept them there, made them refuse to withdraw.
They weren't just puppets of the Japanese, once in this position. They intended to fight their own fight against Britain. They were unconcerned, then, about what the Japanese army did or didn't do, or even whether it was successful in its goals. As Bose had felt on seeing the British flag pulled down in the Andaman Islands off the coast and replaced by the "springing tiger" tricolor flag of Indian nationalism, back in December and January, now, in September, these guys weren't going to readily leave. Here was a chance to start that Revolution in India after all. In a sense, it might be argued that the Japanese retreat may even have made some of them more interested in staying in Mowdok, back in India. Now it was exclusively THEIR fight, no longer in the shadow of Japan, or the aura of treason or "fake" nationalism, but the real thing for them.
World War II was a complicated war. There were numerous little incidents like this, where "good guys" got mixed in with other things. (The "winter war" between Stalin's USSR and Poland in 1939-40 is a parallel story). American/British air strikes finally beat down this little Indian nationalist group, too, though some had already starved to death before they ever gave up and withdrew from the area. Britain could possibly be accused, in this instance, of manipulating American air power to helping it in its "domestic" dispute with Indian nationalists. But in the short-term, no one in the immediate area had time to think like that, of course.
Anyway, 'round about all of this, a lot of unrealistic thinking developed among the India nationalists as well as the Japanese. In this case, Hirohito himself knew the War itself was lost but his deliberate policy was to encourage a lot of excess optimism, in order to prolong it in the hopes of a negotiated settlement. Unlike the Hitler regime in Europe, secret negotiators with Standard Oil, etc., from within Japan, weren't underground. Hirohito knew about them and encouraged them, including dumping Tojo, etc.
Again, the key here, given this climate of "optimism" among Japan/Indian nationalists, is these dates. June 19, 1944 is smack in the middle of them. Having been able to get tens of thousands of Indians to come over during the Malaya/Singapore campaign of 1941-2, they were still wondering if a "repeat performance" could occur, there at the gates of India itself. When about a thousand Indians did "come over" there in March, 1944, it looked good--especially as the drive continued on into India. As of Mid-May, most of the drive had stalled due to the monsoon and Allied air strikes and resupply. But the Indians had driven on into India itself, there at Mowdok and even a few other points. (Though the other points in India itself were occupied for a much briefer duration.) For the Indian nationalists, itseemed too good to be true, and they were hoped up. For the Japanese, it seemed a possible way to cut into British air resupply to their forces elsewhere in Asia. Both got hoped up, and were that way until the pullout of (largely) July 9, 1944, even in the face of heavy casualties. To them, it was worth holding out and being hoped up. (The final Indian nationalists' pullout from India itself didn't occur until September, 1944--that's how hoped up they were. )
So, in the midst of all those high hopes--here's Allen Dulles and the folks at Standard Oil, promising a courier mission to describe a possible oil shipment out of "neutral" Saudi Arabia. Playing on those high hopes,cynically, in order, in reality, just to make big money out of the high priced oil they'd be selling to Nippon, Rockefeller, Dulles and Forrestal were there, with their courier in the Pacific, just as they had them in Europe during that same time frame. That being the case, a prime candidate as such a courier, was G.H. W. Bush, son of Dulles's client and Forrestal's longtime business associate, Prescott Bush. All of 20 years old at the time, he could easily have been told any number of things, especially by spokesmen for Forrestal, Secretary of the Navy and head of ONI, with whom
Bush, as a young reconnaisance pilot, may have already had brief contact. Or, young GHWB may have known all along, since even before he went in, that that was why he was really there. It's impossible to know, right now.
I also recently found some more interesting overlapping dates for the Japanese activity in the "China-Burma-India" campaign (that is, dates that overlap Bush's possible courier activities). One other thing possibly intriguing here, is another name--General Auchinleck. He's intriguing now, because he was the British commander in the Middle East at the time of the 1941 Iraqi pre-Ba'athist coup. Later, in 1943-5, he was a top British commander in the Indo-Burma front. If there were names that cropped up in messages, radio broadcasts, word-of-mouth agents' accounts, etc., such as the name "Bush", as a family name, he, as a commander and co-ordinator of data, would have seen or known about it--or could have. Interesting link. Also, his communications with Mountbatten are intriguing in this regard.
Intriguing, too, is the fact that much of his written material is still, even now, "classified"--under BOTH the British Official Secrets Act and the US NSA/CIA, even though this is relatively old material. The librarian at Ottenheimer suggested that I might access it if I can contact someone at London Gazette archives, official repository of some of this--and to try their website. My efforts met with success at neither
The reason for the intriguing quality, is Allen Dulles and Robert Maxwell's connection to this. The Japanese "held" some islands off the coast of India, and they gave some them an "independent"--but intimidated--status (from Britain) in return for a minimal troop presence (after the initial troop landings of 1942) on neighboring islands . Those technically never-occupied islands would have been an important "neutral" (in the sense that Spain was neutral) stopping-off point for the Standard tanker from "neutral Saudi Arabia to Thailand (again a "neutral"). Indeed, technically, all of this would have put the Standard tanker itself in direct contact only with "neutral" ports. However, the Japanese had to know about it--that was the illegal part. They had to ensure "friendly" dock workers, etc., were there to "guide" the tanker's contents to its necessary destination--Malaya, an officially Japanese-occupied area.
The tanker may have made it part of the way, but I think it's pretty clear this deal didn't work out. They were trying, however. That's the thing to be pointed out, to be discovered, in affirming the validity of that book ad I heard on Houston radio in the fall of 1980. That's what would have brought George Bush to Guam in June 1944. (It's clear, for example, that Communist guerillas in Burma and Malaya attacked Japanese port facilities in 1944--and that the Right represented in the OSS at the time didn't like being affiliated with Communist guerillas. The Communists' attack on such port facilities of that year, referred to in my book via sources, was probably the key to the failure of that 1944 shipment.)
Crowl, Philip A. The War in the Pacific: Campaign in the Marianas. Washington, DC: Office of the Chief of Military History, Dept. of the Army, 1960. 72-75; 314; 322-325; 330-331. Well, I've gotten this particular little 48-60 hour period of WW2 down so "pat" in the past few years, that I've just gotten downright aggressive lately in looking up this data. The period of June 17-20, 1944. I went straight to the horse's mouth tonight--consulted the official US Army records on the Marianas campaign, just to see what the military has to say. Turns out, there's some interesting material there, as well. At the same time, there are statements in this initial document that are further clarified by military historian Edwin P. Hoyt, in To the Marianas. If one didn't read the latter book, one might get a false impression about certain details about the situation on Guam on June 19, 1944. It's important to get this right, since little things like whether someone could land a plane or not at certain times or on certain days, determine the likelilhood of this scenario of whether Bush landed on Guam. First off, let's get further details on the kind of thing I'm talking about in the following:
Bush is recorded bombing Guam on June 16 by Hyams--another date that conflicts with other records (Hoyt), which show US planes hitting Guam in February, 1944, but not bombing again until June 19, 1944--in the morning, shortly before the beginning of the "Marianas turkey shoot" [with its oddly-behaving Japanese planes]. "
Hoyt doesn't specifically say that US planes bombed Guam, but he does refer to air raids on June 11-12, 1944. If one follows closely, cross-referencing between Hoyt and these US military records, one gets a clearer idea about what was going on over and on Guam on June 16, 1944--when this unfortunate young man was shot down, missing and only later found. Again, this is also the first time Hyams says Dick Houle was killed. Hoyt (113) refers to "The American carrier strike of June 11 [against]...Guam...The next day the carrier planes struck again and destroyed 17 more Japanese aircraft...
"On June 13...[t]he carriers continued to harry various islands in the Marianas [for those of you who don't know, Guam is in the Marianas Islands group--mcs]."
After that, though, Hoyt really is silent about US air attacks against Guam until June 19. It's quite clear, though, that there were some. In addition to Hyams's confusing account, the official US Army account on the Marianas campaign, (comp. by Philip A. Crowl for the Dept. of the Army in DC), has this to say:
"In the belief that the island [Guam] would be invaded on 18 June, Commander Task Force 58, first unleashed his mighty armada of fighters and bombers against Guam and nearby Rota on 11-12 June...For the next four days, one or more of Mitscher's task groups carried out strikes against aircraft facilities, runways, coastal guns, and antiaircraft positions on Guam and Rota...(Crowl 323)."
After noting the devastation to Japan's forces on Guam from these air attacks, Crowl describes a similar scenario to that of Hoyt. He has, in the process, filled in the blanks as to whether Bush's squadron hit Guam on June 16--clearly, they did. The question is, was a young man shot down and lost track of, on that day, or another day; and was Dick Houle shot down and killed that day, or on July 27?
Crowl goes on to note, with Hoyt, that though the Japanese had been devastated by the US air attacks on Guam, "Yet there was still some fight left in the Japanese air contingent on Guam, for on the evening of 15 June, a few planes took off from Orote field [on Guam] to launch a low-level torpedo attack against the Americans offshore. As a result, two of Mitscher's task group next day concentrated heavily on Guam to prevent a repetition of the previous evening's attacks..."
This clearly means Bush's squadron did attack Guam on June 16, 1944. In a sense, though, confirmation of this only raises as many questions as it answers: was Houle shot down then, and the "missing pilot" become missing then--or did these events happen on July 27-- as Hyams (98) confusedly tells us also.
Immediately after this section, Crowl describes a situation that would seem, if read only as he phrases it, to completely destroy any scenario for Bush to have landed on Guam on June 19, 1944. First, I will quote Crowl's exact words--which are a generalized account of activities on Guam that day. Then, I will follow with Hoyt's account of those same events, which gives more detail and clarifies how this actually panned out. Finally, I'll
quote again from Crowl, to show that this business of landing on Guam wasn't as far-fetched as it might appear.
"...During the Battle of the Philippine Sea, the fields of Guam again received the attention of Mitscher's fliers. Japanese land-based planes still undamaged by previous raids, as well as carrier planes that had flown in from Ozawa's fleet, constituted a threat on Mitscher's flank and rear and could not be overlooked. On the morning of June 19, before the great Marianas Turkey Shoot had even gotten well under way, two separate air battles were fought over Guam, both ending in victory for the Americans. Even during the course of the main battle itself, which was fought well out to sea, Mitscher kept one contingent of fighters and bombers over Guam to interdict airfields and prevent any remaining planes from taking off to join Ozawa's carrier planes. All together, about fifty Guam based planes were destroyed on the 19th alone, and the fields themselves were at least temporarily put out of business.[emphasis added].That night, when about fifteen Japanese carrier bombers attempted to make emergency landings there, they found the fields too torn up to do so and, being out of fuel, had to crash (Crowl 324)."
Pretty strong stuff--sounds like, in this general description of events, that Bush couldn't possibly have landed on Guam. However, we need to read more closely. Hoyt, by 1980, twenty years later, is giving a more detailed account, pulling from the same set of records as Crowl, plus adding those additional details he has obtained by cross-referencing other information that has become more available by that later date. It turns out that, when looked at in more detail, the time-frame was really there for Bush to have been able to land on Guam:
"Just after ten o'clock the radar operators saw Admiral Ozawa's strike force coming, 150 miles west of them. Mitscher had less than half an hour to prepare. He called in all the fighters that had been vectored out on search and combat missions [this is including those fighters and bombers that had been sent out to Guam earlier--as we'll see in a moment] and ordered the carriers to launch all available fighter planes. At 10:20 they were launching, as the Japanese arrived. But the Japanese, instead of boring in to take advantage of shock and surprise, began to circle and regroup as they came into sight of the carriers. This delay gave the carriers time to get all the bombers off the decks and to launch more fighters and for the American fighters in the air to prepare..." (Hoyt 150).
This is when George Bush took off in his TBM Avenger torpedo bomber.
"...Immediately after the fighter contingent had left the Bunker Hill's deck, Captain T. P. Jeter launched a bomber strike against Guam. By this time, Admiral Mitscher was cognizant of Admiral Ozawa's strategy and was determined to deny the Japanese any advantage from the shuttle technique. He sent bombers and fighters to hit the airfields of Guam..."
The point to be considered here, seemingly unimportant, is the matter of hours that it took for these various seemingly overlapping events to occur. In a battle scene such as this, it is difficult to sort things out, but in this case, I'm trying to determine the feasibility of something: could an American aircraft have flown ahead of the US fleet toward Guam, after having taken off at the point given above for the bomber takeoff (about 10:20 a.m.), been able to evade US aircraft, and land on Guam, with a usable airfield under its wheels--and not be strafed or bombed by US planes overhead?
Crowl's more general account makes this sound virtually impossible--but then we see that Hoyt's more detailed account gives us a time-frame that would work. It is clear that it was some time after the bombers took off to clear the carrier decks, before fighters and bombers were ordered to hit Guam again. One fighter group that Hoyt notes--which was only typical--had to orbit for 15 minutes before leaving for Guam--and even then was distracted by Japanese planes for several more minutes.
Ironically, Bush's plane would have been relatively safe from Japanese aircraft attack--they were focusing on the carriers. It's clear, too, that Mitscher must have waited until at least "11:00, [when] the first wave [of attacking Japanese planes] had broken up. . .Just about a third of the strike force headed back for their carriers: of the total sixty-nine planes, forty-two were either shot down in this raid or managed to land on Guam or Tinian. . ." (Hoyt 152).
Thus, we see Hoyt's account tells us that the US fighters and bombers were first sent over Guam at 6:30 a.m., (146-7), attacking for about an hour, then ordered to return to guard the carriers by 8:30 a.m (148). Furthermore, Hoyt tells us that the closest American carriers were "two and a half hours away" (146) from the Japanese fleet, which was just on the other side of Guam and the other Marianas Islands from the US fleet.
Given all this, it is easy to see why Hoyt tells us (159) that:
"...in late afternoon, [emphasis added] as the last of the planes from the Japanese carrier fleet were fighting for their lives over Guam..."
and that:
"...the Americans had overwhelming force available over Guam that
afternoon [emphasis added]...At least fifty planes based on Guam had
been destroyed and others flown up from Truk and other islands had never
made it to land. On the night of June 19 [emphasis added], there were
still many Japanese pilots on Guam, but their airfield had been bombed
repeatedly during the day and most of the installations were destroyed or
damaged (Hoyt 161)."
But perhaps the most interesting footnote to all of this, comes again from Crowl, who notes (73):
"The task groups were less successful in bombing enemy airfields. Few runways on these or any other outlying bases were surfaced with concrete, macadem, or steel strip since the comparatively light weight of Japanese aircraft made such expenditure of time and material unnecessary, and it proved almost impossible to render earthen airfields permanently unserviceable by moderate bombing attacks."
Thus, this time-frame and this scenario still stand. I feel as if these have now "been through the fire," having been subjected to the toughest test of all--the blow by blow official account of what happened over Guam on June 19, 1944. Having at first been appalled at the general account, I then referred again to Hoyt's specific accounts, and found that, though Guam, by dark on June 19, had unusable airstrips, in the morning hours, between when the fighters were temporarily recalled for the first Japanese air strike--at 8:30 a.m.--and the time the main or first Japanese attack was broken up--11:00 to 12:00.--there was sufficient time for Bush's plane to get to Guam and land on a usable airfield.
Keep in mind, too, that both Hyams and Hoyt tell us that Japanese AA gunners had been ordered not to fire on individual, lone US aircraft as of the US invasion of Saipan on June 15--four days before this. Why? The Japanese soon learned that occasionally US fliers came over individually, in order to get AA to fire on them. Once the AA fired, however, US Navy warships could spot them and shell them. Hence, it was deemed too great a risk to fire at lone US aircraft--only formations of US aircraft were a sufficiently important target to risk drawing such naval gunfire.
Hyams even goes so far as to tell us that Bush and his squadron already knew this, as they flew over the various Marianas Islands. Bush was flying a lone plane that day, too, when he would have landed on still-Japanese-held Guam, in my scenario. He wasn't to fly out, however. Rather, he left the plane with the Japanese, as a goodwill gesture for future (in the Dulles scenario) alliance with the Axis against Russia and Mao. When that didn't work out, James Forrestal, Secretary of the Navy--who, with Dulles, had helped arrange the Bush courier mission--went ashore (as head of ONI, among other things), got the area where Bush's plane was, classified, sectored off, then flew Bush's plane to Saipan on the evening of July 30, after airfields on both Guam and Saipan were usable to US forces, and burned Bush's plane--something he was seen doing by US Marine Tom Devine, then stationed on Saipan. Devine later tried to figure out why Forrestal would have been burning the plane, and came to the conclusion it may have involved "Amelia Earhart's plane."
Fake Japanese priests were on Guam; the Vatican was involved in Dulles's attempts to negotiate with the Axis (behind FDR's back) at that time; and Bush had a medallion given to Standard Oil VP Joseph Larkin in 1928 (Higham 21), at the behest of the Fascist government of Italy (SRJ Hine). Photographs of a similar "Maltese cross" show it looks almost identical to the Nazi Iron Cross (See SRJ Hine). That medallion got George Bush of Standard Oil--a company the Japanese knew was a friend--a hearing with the head Japanese Pacific commander, whom several sources (including Hoyt and Paul Carano) tell us was stranded on Guam. The Emperor gave the Marianas commander his utmost authority, so any message from him would have been important.
And Crowl tells us (325) that Japanese Colonel Takesha reported after the war that US bombing did virtually no damage to Japanese telephone and radio communications on Guam by June 19. David Bergamini tells us that repeated speeches by Hirohito over the radio since 1941 had encouraged all Japanese in the field to "work closely with our American friends" whenever possible.
It just all begins to mesh. I confess I'm almost surprised at how well this thing holds up, "under fire" this way!
*Davies, Nicholas. The Unknown Maxwell. London: Sidgwick and Jackson, Ltd., 1992. Pan, 1993. Yet another negative biography of Robert Maxwell. Does have interesting data re: the circumstances of his death. (Cited by Russell Davies). 334: "However, what was unusual about Maxwell's last flight to the Lady Ghislaine was that he went alone. No secretary, no valet, no butler, no one. He had never done that before." (Bower does note that Maxwell "cheered up" when he got news that a young woman had come aboard after a stop at one of the Canary Islands.) 336: "Maxwell told Rankin to sail to the Canaries and arrived in the morning of November 4. He spoke to Burrington and apologized for disrupting his lunch; he phoned Dr. Pisar in Paris. Pisar recalled: 'We talked of plans for the immediate future, chiefly Maxwell's excitement at being nominated by the Scientific Institute in France to receive the Légion d'honeur, France's highest award, and he was to be made Man of the Year by the Jewish Scientific and Cultural Institute at the Plaza Hotel, New York, later in November. There was satisfaction in his voice. A man that contemplates suicide does not think that way.' 338: "On the morning Maxwell died the main sliding doors were found locked from the outside, and the heavy steel-framed doors leading to the deck were closed. Maxwell's key was missing and Rankin had to use the master key...What was so unusual was that Maxwell had closed doors behind him, because he never did, let alone lock them [[emphasis added]. The locking of the doors was a deliberate act and yet was not included in the Spanish police report." Yet despite these oddities, N. Davies--very unlike R. Davies below--goes on to conclude that Maxwell probably committed suicide.
Davies, Russell. Foreign Body: The Secret Life of Robert Maxwell. London: Bloomsbury, 1995. 90-92; 94-7; 100; 109, 109n2; 114-16; 119; 130; 144; 171-7, 175n1; 178- 81; 184; 192-3; 198-220. Fascinating journalistic "insider" style insights into Maxwell's hidden life as an intelligence and organized crime afficionado. Mr. Russell provides an interesting scenario to account for Maxwell's death: one that involves an allegedly satellite-photographed boat that pulled alongside Maxwell's yacht before his death, taking off a person already aboard, who apparently was British and was employed by CIA and MI6 to kill Maxwell. His scenario--that Maxwell was pushed into the sea unconscious, recovered consciousness on hitting the water, realized swimming was too dangerous and painful, and so attempted to float for hours, dying of hypothermia in minutes. He was, says Russell, clearly trying to keep himself afloat from the position his body was found it--belly up. MI6 and CIA had him under close surveillance--Russell provides documentation of this. An interesting overheard public phone conversation of a Maxwell yacht crew member is also noted. In 1991, Bush was still President--his longstanding ties to persons such as Brent Scowcroft and John Tower, and his limited dealings with Maxwell, are detailed. Suspicions are raised as to the circumstances of the death of Sen. Tower; interesting coincidental dates as to "computer hacking" and software theft by Maxwell associates and the CIA, as to their possible connection to the "politically true" scenario.
Edwards, Anne. Early Reagan. New York: Morrow, 1987. ( All page numbers listed below are from her book alone.) For the chapter called "Better Not 'Red' and Dead: Reagan Becomes A Republican," I've continued research in that area, and, while it's clear Reagan wasn't exactly a flaming liberal Democrat from fairly early on, and that he worked closely at times with the FBI, he also did things or joined organizations and activities that set him up for possible blackmail and other manipulation by ruthless types. The latter, in fact, might explain his emerging conservative views and even his cooperation with the FBI in its investigations. Some details she mentioned that aren't contained in the main sources I used in the original chapter include:
1. That Reagan and Jane Wyman were approached by "FBI agents" as early as September 1941 about his membership in controversial organizations--and that he agreed, as a result of those meetings, to act as an "informant" for the FBI (304).
2. That Reagan's membership in the Hollywood Anti-Fascism League via his membership in the Screen Actors' Guild (SAG) was, indeed, highly controversial, vulnerable to attack from the Right, and highly political in nature. SAG early on a had a pro-Left group and took extremely strong anti-Nazi positions long before the US went to war. In Edwards' words, after Reagan was elected President of SAG (322), he was "presiding over a hotbed of political activism from both the Left and the Right."
3. That Reagan began to work for Republican Presidential candidates, most especially Richard Nixon, as early as the closing days of Helen Gahagan Douglas's campaign against the former in 1950. This was 12 years before Reagan has acknowledged his actual activity in behalf of the GOP (417).This, even though Reagan had pledged his support to Douglas personally in April, 1950 (ibid). (Edwards also quotes sources in the section surrounding this page to the effect that the "dirty tricks" the Nixon campaign engaged in against the Douglas campaign that year were not to be "fully revealed" until the Watergate era.)
4. Could this have been affected by what happened on April 10, 1947? That day, only a month after his election to the presidency of the SAG, Reagan was approached by "FBI agents" again:
"Records obtained through the Freedom of Information Act...make clear that
Reagan and Wyman met with FBI agents...Reagan claimed that three men appeared unannounced at his home one evening and identified themselves as FBI agents. One asked, 'We thought someone the Communists hated as much as they hate you might be willing to help us?' He [Reagan] protested that HE DIDN'T WANT TO 'GO IN FOR RED-BAITING.'[[emphasis added]. They then rattled off a list of names, dates, places and conversations that he had been privy to and others that, as he said, 'opened my eyes to a good many things.'. . .(305)."
That last phrase is especially interesting, given Reagan's sometime gift for understatement and wit. To me, now, it takes on a somewhat different tone. Isn't Reagan saying something here, to the effect that, "Boy, if I DIDN'T go along with these guys on this informant thing now, wasn't this going to make me look bad?"
"Ex-Producers Defend CNN Story: Military Pressure Caused Network to Cave, Fire Them, Two Tell Media." Arkansas Democrat-Gazette, July 23, 1998. (AP). "Discredited" reporters Jack Smith and April Olliver assert the point in the headline, as well as: (1) another source had surfaced in subsequent days alleging a similar use of Sarin gas in Cambodia, on condition of anonymity; (2) Admiral Thomas Moorer had originally read and approved their TV script.
Feis, Herbert L. Japan Subdued. Princeton, NJ: Univ. Press, 1961. 12-18, esp. 15: "Acting Secretary of State Grew had been Ambassador in Japan during the ten years that had ended mournfully in 1941. He believed that the war could have been averted and had not ceased to regret what he regarded as the failure not only of Japanese but also of American diplomacy. Encouraged by him, informed experts on the Far East attached to the State Department had been for many months working on a statement of policies toward Japan which might serve as a basis for an arranged surrrender.1
"Late in April the aged Admiral Kantaro Suzuki was named Prime Minister. He had been regarded as a 'moderate,' and had been wounded in the military uprising of 1936. His selection evoked a hope in the State Department that the Emperor was bent on finding a way to end the war.2
"On May 1st, at his regular meeting with the Secretaries of War and Navy, Grew found support for an attempt to bring about a salvaging and reconciling peace. Secretary of the Navy Forrestal raised the question 'How far and how thoroughly do we want to beat Japan?' Grew and Stimson had said that they shared his belief that it would be regrettable if we had to lay Japan in ruins before it would submit, and that for many reasons the American government would be well advised to try to secure the end before the damage was complete. . ."
1. "The State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee (SWNCC) had approved a paper by Dr. George H. Blakeslee and Dr. Hugh Borton as early as the summer of 1944. See F.C. Jones, H. Borton, B.R. Pearn, Survey of International Relations, 1939-1944, The Far East, 1942-46, page 316n." [It is thus interesting to note the "FIT" annotation in the CK Bronson's deck log for June 21, 1944, in reference to Bush's crew here. Bush, we recall, may have gotten into the Navy as a pilot at 18 (rather than the normally-required minimum age of 21) through the intervention of Allen Dulles at OSS--who was also Bush's father's attorney and business partner, as well as a partner of Forrestal at Standard Oil. (See Tarpley and Chaitkin and Loftus and Aarons, in the various chapters and pages cited in my other chapters, for more on this.) Interesting also that Forrestal had disappeared during this "summer of 1944"--and that Bush seems to be "out of pocket", too. Interesting, too, that Robert Lovett and Artemis Gates were Assistant Secretaries at Navy and Defense. Both of the latter were business partners and/or fraternity mates of Prescott Bush and Allen Dulles. Interesting, too, is the "coordination" between War and Navy here.
2. "What has since become known of the circumstances of his selection indicates that this hope was justified. The Army had another candidate Suzuki was proposed by the group of former Prime Ministers known as the Jushin. A characteristic Japanese deal was made whereby promises were given that Suzuki would comply with the judgment of the Army if it would cease its opposition. However, at the instance of the Emperor's brother, Prince Takamatsu, Suzuki assured the Emperor that as Prime Minister he would implicitly carry out the Emperor's wishes."
Fell, Barry. America BC: Ancient Settlers in the NewWorld. New York: Pocket, 1976. 108-9; 112-121; 125-55 ("The Celts in America"). Significant for our purposes in noting the ancient presence of Celtic ("Irish") people in the New World, B.C., are Fell's notes on the written descriptions by Julius Caesar of the gigantic ships of the Celts, and the archaeological evidence such as "dolmens" (130, 132, 133) and "Mystery Hill." It should be noted that other groups were evidently visitors to America, too, including possibly Indians, Egypto-Romans, Phoenicians, Chinese and Africans. However, Fell's work suggests it was Celts who were lasting visitors in the BC era. It is they who could best be described as having "inhabited" North America before Columbus--or even Leif Erikson. Since Celts dwelt in Eastern North America by 800 BC on a permanent basis (to post-55BC) while some South American Pacific Coast Indians didn't arrive until then, Celts could be considered "Indians."
Ferraro, Geraldine, with Linda Bird Francke. My Story. New York: 1985, Bantam. 258- 60; 265-67; 271-5; 277-83; 285-9; 290-98; 305-6; 308-9; 310-13; 316; 320.
Forrestal Diaries. Walter Millis, ed. New York: Viking, 1951. 544-555. Millis describes the results of extensive compilation of materials relating to Forrestal's last days, the mysterious aura about Forrestal's death. There have been many speculations from many quarters, as to his death. He died May 21-2 (that is, about midnight), 1949. He fell from the sixteenth floor of Bethesda Naval Hospital in Maryland, where he'd been admitted for severe depression a few weeks before. He'd had a lot of famous company in the days before his death.
But, flashing back to the events immediately before the final onset of that worst round of depression, Forrestal had become indecisive; he was also undecided about whether to continue as Secretary of Defense, and he, essentially, ended up virtually bugging President Truman about it. (The editor doesn't say this in so many words, but it becomes apparent: he requested numerous meetings with Truman to discuss the issue.)
"His calendar and the log kept by his orderly show that, after a morning of only two appointments and few telephone calls, none after 10:30, Forrestal went to the White House.The entry on his calendar reads: '12:30: the President (White House) off-the-record.' He did not return to his office until 2:20. He then had only four visitors, the last at 4:15, but he remained in his office alone until 6:35, when he went home. He left no record of any of this day's events, but at least one friend came to understand later that the President at the midday meeting had asked Forrestal to send his letter of resignation over at once and that his request had been a 'shattering experience'.
"Until this interview Forrestal evidently had felt that submission of his resignation letter was not an urgent matter. Now he began to work on it at a fever pitch. ..Forrestal kept advancing its effective date until he fixed it for March 31...[Forrestal told his aide that] the President wished him to stay until June 1 but that he wanted to get out sooner ..(552)."
Millis then goes on to describe Forrestal's early--but late-- sending of the letter. After keeping on at Truman about how he was ready to retire from public life, then backtracking, Truman had obviously gotten impatient. A day late, and several more hours after Truman requested it at last, Forrestal's letter of resignation was delivered to Truman--who, keep in mind, hadn't "started it" about Forrestal's fretting about retiring or not, but was now ready to have his time--as President of the United States--freed up again. Forrestal said in the letter he'd retire on March 31. Truman replied: "your letter received this day confirms our many previous conversations and discussions. I am therefore fully cognizant of the considerations which prompt your desire to relinquish your duties as Secretary of Defense. At my personal urging you have agreed to remain in Washington far beyond the time when you had expressed a hope of leaving government service. . . for all that you have done in your country's behalf and for the service which you will continue to give out of your abundant experience, I tender you heartfelt assurance of my gratitude and appreciation."
Millis notes of this:
"On this interchange the diary ends. To Forrestal, it apparently came with the force of a dismissal under fire. He had wished for retirement. He had been half prepared to relinquish his post to an ambitious claimant. He was not prepared for the events of March 1, when he apparently was asked abruptly to send in a resignation letter. The experience seems to have undermined his self-confidence and unduly exaggerated that sense of inadequacy. . . he began to reveal a state of emotional depression...that he was cracking under internal stresses...(553)."
Even though Truman and his staff and the military gave Forrestal a suprise going-away ceremony, it didn't help his state (554).
"Directly after the meeting Forrestal left by air for Hobe Sound, Florida, as a guest of Robert Lovett, his old friend and colleague in so many crises of state. . .(553)."
Anyway, by the end of April, Forrestal had been responding well to treatment (Millis, Diaries, 554). But on the night of May 21, in his hospital room, he began copying the words of a poem, William Mackworth Praed's translation of an old Sophocles poem, "Chorus of Ajax." Key words this poem that may explain what triggered Forrestal's apparent leap out the window in the next few minutes, include:
"...THY SON IS IN A FOREIGN CLIME,
Where Ida feeds her countless flocks,
Far from thy dear, remembered rocks,
Worn by waste of time---
COMFORTLESS, nameless, hopeless save
In the dark prospect of the yawning grave. . .
The section he was copying, goes on:
Woe to the mother in her close of day,
Woe to her desolate heart and temples gray
When she shall hear
Her loved one's story whispered in her ear!
"Woe, woe!" will be the cry--
No quiet murmur like the tremulous wail
of the lone bird, the querulous nightingale--
Millis notes that the "copying ceased on this word (nightingale). Forrestal put the sheets he'd been copying the poem onto, into the back of the book, walked over to the window, and "fell to his death from its unguarded window" (555).
In what I think is an issue related to that which was haunting Forrestal, David Bergamini, in Japan's Imperial Conspiracy, confirms my suspicions about Tsuji Masanobu. (1004-5): he was, indeed, a courier (yet another courier!) between Chiang Kai Shek's forces and the Japanese, and precisely during the time when Chiang engaged in those secret negotiations that resulted in the successes of the Japanese "Ichigo offensive" which resulted in the capture of US newly-built airstrips in Northern China from which we were to at last have been able to bomb the Japanese home islands. With those airbases lost, the US had to move even faster to capture the Marianas--Guam and Saipan--from which, again, Japan proper could be reached by large, land-based bombers.
Thus, Tsuji Masanobu's apparent later communications in the postwar years with Allen Dulles--noted in an earlier e-mail by me in a reference to Loftus and Aarons--are largely confirmed. The significance of that connection is also confirmed. Dulles had, indeed, been involved in those Chiang-Japan secret negotiations. And, since Forrestal was his partner at Standard Oil, and was publicly opposed to the bombing of the Japanese home islands, HIS involvement is also clear.
And, since Forrestal continued to oppose the bombing of Japan proper even after the US offensive against the Marianas only weeks later, and since Dulles, (again, Forrestal's partner at S. O.) was precisely at that time--we now know ala Loftus and Aarons--involved in the (unknown to FDR) negotiations with Germans to replace Hitler with a new Far Right government that would offer peace to the West but continuing war with the Russians and Mao's forces, that larger picture of the diplomatic coup Dulles/Forrestal hoped to present GOP candidate Dewey with during the Fall '44 Presidential election, is further reinforced.
Bergamini (1046) also confims Masanobu's disappearance. He speculates he may have still been alive (this, in 1971) and a CIA agent in Hanoi, after his disappearance Laos. However, given his inside knowledge about Dulles during the new JFK admin., a real potential blackmail threat that Dulles didn't need--and given his continued contact with CIA, I now suspect that Dulles had him killed there in Laos in 1961.
It's not like he didn't have it coming: this fellow had mistreated thousands or millions of persons, civilian and military, in Singapore, the Philippines, and China during the War--as Bergamini recounts in disgusting detail. The massacre of 250,000 Chinese for the harboring of the Doolittle raiders, the Bataan Death March, the "Death Railway" of Singapore and Thailand--were all essentially this "genius's" idea. So, .it's amazing--and apparently a credit to Dulles's power to manipulate events--that he wasn't EXECUTED for those war crimes much earlier. Dulles probably didn't shed many tears, himself, on having the bastard killed. It took him long enough. So another interesting, "coincidental" death.
As for Forrestal's suicide--and I tend to think it WAS a suicide for this inconsolable patriot-- the nightingale is a night bird. Obviously, Forrestal tried to be the same. But, why? Could it be that the poem reminded him of his "night bird" antics in flying George Bush's abandoned TBM Avenger from by-then recaptured Guam, to Saipan on that July, 1944 evening recalled by Marine Tom Devine? And--was George the "comfortless son" of that poem, ala Prescott's May 2 and May 15, 1944 behavior in helping sell oil to his son's enemies?
Lovett was one of that clique which helped Prescott get George into the Navy as an underage pilot, in 1942. He and Artemus Gates were fellow Skull and Bones members with Prescott Bush. Tarpley and Chaitkin note several implications of the Lovett/Gates connection in the Unauthorized Biography.
Forrestal committed suicide. He wasn't murdered. But his suicide was partly motivated by his feelings of remorse over what he'd done in participating in the June and July activities of Dulles and others in trying to negotiate w/the Axis behind FDR's back. As close as he was to the boys in combat, the idea began to sink in on him that he'd caused additional casualties, and he got to a point where he couldn't stand it. He also had NO ONE he could talk to about it, in the circles he was then most intimately involved with--the Truman Admin. people. Truman would have hung him by his thumbs, at least rhetorically, for trying to cut deals w/Japan to shorten the war behind FDR's back.
Fossey, Kenneth. The I.G. Farben and Standard Oil International Cartel of World War II. Mankato, Minn: Mankato State College unpublished MS thesis, December 1969. 4-7. Direct quotes of the materials referring to the 1947 Standard treason conviction.
Freedman, Anne E. and P. E. The Psychology of Political Control. New York: St. Martin's, 1975. 204-11: Notes on G.R.I.T. (Graduated Reciprical Tension- Reduction), an innovative JFK idea that gradually disappeared under LBJ.
*Gailey, Harry A. Howlin' Mad vs. The Army. Novato, CA: Presidio, 1986.
*--------. The Liberation of Guam. Novato, CA: Presidio, 1988.
*--------. Peleliu, 1944. Annapolis, MD: Nautical and Aviation, 1983.
*Gerald, James. In the Public Interest: A Devastating Account of the Thatcher Government's Involvement in the Covert Arms Trade, By the Man Who Turned Astra Fireworks into a D-100m Arms Manufacturer. London: Warner, 1996
Ghosh, K.K. The Indian National Army: Second Front of the Indian Independence Movement. Meerut: Meenakshi Prakashan,1969. ix-x, 22-34;174-5; 180-1; 186-9; 260-267; Appendix 1: 277; Appendix II: 307; 324-330; 330(D); 331: Chart 1; 332: Chart 2; 333: Chart 3; 334-339: Bibliography notes, including specific references to other sources. Halliday, Jon. A Political History of Japanese Capitalism. New York: Random House/Pantheon, 1975. [See reference to Note 9, "see K.K. Ghosh, The Indian National Army: Second Front of the Indian Independence Movement. (Meerut: Meenakshi Prakashan, 1969) pp. 22-34.
Goerner, Fred. The Search for Amelia Earhart.(This is an update: see Bibliography for a complete citation.) A couple of my chapters have titles like "'Amelia Earhart's Plane,'" and titles pertaining to Robert Maxwell and Alexander Haig, etc. These are pertaining to the ins and outs of various intelligence operatives. What I'm seeing right now, is a new point in relatively old material from Fred Goerner. Goerner was an Earhart "conspiracy theorist"--which I am not. The reason I have found he and Tom Devine useful in my researches is because they did just a couple of things that got a couple of questions asked of the right people about the right place, not that their goals were mine or that their conclusions were mine. They were asking around about Saipan in World War II. That's the point that's of use to me. Also, I recently realized that Goerner, in his interview with "Fred Winter of the CIA," who was stationed in San Francisco at the time of his interview with Goerner, had obtained some interesting material. Throughout that section of the book, (136-144) Goerner is partly giving his views, etc. But he makes a couple of interesting statements and asks a couple of interesting questions that got interesting answers.
He describes Winter as someone who liked to affect a "wealthy" lifestyle. He also reports that "someone" was following him around when he visited Saipan. He asks Winter about this, if those people were CIA.
Winter says no. "It might be another group noting your habits and contacts, hoping for some untoward act on your part which could be used for blackmail."
[Goerner]: "That's a happy thought. Communists?"
[Winter]: "Possibly. But I don't think so. They would go about it differently."
[Goerner]: "Who then?" I asked with agitation.
"Winter smiled at that point and shook his head. "I have no answers, but don't worry about it."
Winter then goes on to tell Goerner to let him know if they continue to bother him and he'd "see what can be done about it."
Goerner then goes on to ask Winter of CIA specifically about any CIA
knowledge about Amelia Earhart.
"All right. But you haven't explained Earhart."
Winter thought for a moment and said, "That is somewhat puzzling. I don't
believe the intelligence community is intentionally witholding the material you want."
"Then why are we having such a hassle getting permission to study those remains? Why does the Navy act as if I'm the ghoul of the year for mentioning the matter..."
[Winter]: "There's no doubt there...The Navy is protecting NTTU [a secret intelligence operation on Saipan related to guerilla warfare in Communist China, based in part on Saipan]. . . ."
In other words, Winter says a couple of interesting things that reinforce my theory that Jewish intelligence knew about the Bush business, and Forrestal's part in it, early on. The "followers" were obviously "friendly" intelligence who couldn't be automatically banned from Saipan for security reasons. Jewish intelligence would have qualified. Also, Winter's statement about "blackmail" by these persons, suggests that, with his mock-Rockefeller style, he was also aware, as an intelligence operative, of their blackmail of Rockefeller re: his treason in World War II, described in my book and given a context in connnection with Forrestal--and described initially in Loftus and Aarons.
Finally, Winter, in spite of everything, has said NOTHING here, to suggest that the CIA was covering up anything at all about Amelia Earhart. Winter exhibits nothing in his remarks but a vague curiousity, combined with a kind of "that's news to me" attitude. Clearly, CIA wasn't trying to cover up anything about Amelia.
But perhaps Jewish intelligence was, even then, trying to see why someone from Stateside would be visiting Saipan, where Forrestal had destroyed Bush's Avenger after pulling it from a cave hiding place on Guam and flying it over to Saipan to destroy it. This latter event has been reported, as noted before, by Tom Devine.
One other point as to the likelihood of a plane being hideable on Guam--which is a considerably larger island than Saipan and covered with mountains and caves--is reinforced by a primary source. "How the Guam Operation Was Conducted," compiled and published by the Ground Self-Defense Force staff in its October and November 1962 issues of Kambo Gakko Kiji. (Described in an accompanying form letter by Col. Louis Metzger, USMC, as "copy of a study made in 1962 of the Guam Operation by Japanese Self DefenseForce Team"):
"The largest spring is found at the south end of Agana Swamp. (This swamp lies southeast of Agana. In the spring of 1962, a former Japanese Army's fighting plane was found here)" (42).
The report also reiterates a point we've known for years: how several Japanese soldiers remained in hiding on Guam until many years after the war, until, in fact the '60s. The report makes several references to many mountains, cliffs and caves on Guam. For example,
"In this vicinity [of Pigo Heights] are also remains of side-cave anti-air-raid trenches used for storage of ammunition and provisions at that time [that is, during the Japanese occupation of Guam in the days before the US Marianas invasion](45)."
Intriguingly, the report gives us the "official" report that war historian Edwin P. Hoyt noted in his To the Marianas: that the overall Japanese commander for the entire Marianas was on Guam on and after June 19, 1944. Normally his base was Saipan. However,
"Lt. Gen. Kobata, army commander, and his party which had been inspecting operational preparations in the Palau area since 5 June, intended to hurry back to Saipan. However, since the Japanese forces lost air supremacy, Kosata had to carry on his command from Guam from 19 June."
Finally, numerous sources tell us that the Marianas was a top priority to Tojo, the Japanese General Staff and Emperor Hirohito. Once they were lost, Japan proper could be bombed by US planes, something that hadn't been possible since the US lost its just-built bases in Northern China as a result of Chiang's betrayal of his own forces to the Japanese during their "Ichigo Offensive" of Spring 1944. (See Smith, OSS, pages cited in "Working With Chiang Kai Shek," and especially Bagby 234). Prior to the departure of col. Takeda for the Marianas of early March/April, 1944, he was told by the Japanese General Staff (clearly at the behest of Emperor Hirohito himself):
"The Mariana Islands are Japan's final defensive line. Loss of these islands signifies Japan's surrender. Should any of these islands fall into enemy's hands, it must be recovered by all means with concentrated powers of the Army, Navy and Air Force."
David Bergamini notes that, after Saipan fell, Hirohito knew the cause was lost, but kept up the facade. Going into that loss of the Marianas, however, my research suggests a lot of diplomatic activity, as well as military, by Japan and its American friends in those weeks of June, 1944.
Since Robert Maxwell was with Israeli intelligence (whose agents, we see, may have even briefly "skulked around" on Saipan during those weeks recorded by Goerner), as well as British intelligence-- and commonly used his power as a publisher to "run ads" to manipulate various politicians to do things he wanted--he is a prime suspect in the radio ad I heard in Houston in Fall 1980.
Goldman, Peter, and Tony Fuller. The Quest for the Presidency, 1984. New York: Bantam, 1985. 16-21; 171; 249-50; 290-303; 318-322; 323; 324; 328; 331-36; 339-41; 342-50; 355-58; 360; 441-2; 450-1.
Guam: Information on Guam Transmitted by the United States to the Secretary-General of the United Nations Pursuant to Article 73 (e) of the Charter. Washington, DC: Navy Department, 1948.
Haig, Alexander Meigs. Caveat: Realism, Reagan, and Foreign Policy. New York: MacMillan, 1984. 74-86; 91-4; 97-8; 115-16; 141-155; 156-162; 163-166; 168; 183-188; 299-301; 305-316; 318-19; 334-35; 338-356. Provides insight into the difference between Haig's views on such issues as the sale of AWACs planes to Saudi Arabia--something Israel vehemently opposed, as did Haig--almost alone in the Reagan Cabinet. Also data on his concerns about the investigation of a conspiracy the day Reagan was shot.
Haines, Joe. Maxwell. Boston: Houghton-Mifflin, 1988 . 21-2; 171-2; 382-6; 402-5. Written before Maxwell's death by his business associate. a big color photo of Maxwell meeting with Ronald Reagan. What's interesting about the photo is the date: 1987. It was 1988 when Reagan first began to seem to "backslide" on Bush. He refused to endorse Bush versus the other Republican Presidential contenders in the GOP primaries in 1988, then refused to even say whether he'd voted for Bush that year. Then, in 1992, he told Clinton he voted for him instead of Bush.
If Maxwell was aware of that book about Bush in WW2, ran the ad or had a copy of it, did he give it to Reagan when he met with him in 1987? Haines also notes that in 1987-8, (as, be it noted, Reagan was growing more distant from Bush), he was simultaneously growing closer to Robert Maxwell, appointing him to head a commission to "improve America's image" overseas. This is odd, considering that Maxwell was a British citizen! It almost sounds like some sort of a "cover", Reagan using this commission work of Maxwell's as an excuse to keep up communications with him. Could it be that Maxwell had told Reagan something he'd never known, or had enlightened him on something he may have had a hint about--perhaps through Alexander Haig before he left the Administration in 1982. (Haig, you may recall, was also a secret Israeli agent, like Maxwell.) According to the time-scale advanced in the book, former President Carter met with Maxwell in 1987, accompanied in the photo presented by major Japanese multi-millionaire. Loftus and Aarons, who have been a useful source for much of my research but who nevertheless are skeptics about the "October Surprise", refer to no other books on Maxwell except Haines's positive biography. Perhaps this is yet another hint--along with what I mention in the text--as to the fact that they ignore the data Barbara Honnegar has found pertaining to Bush's connections with the Knights of Malta and P-2. Through the latter, Bush connected with organized crime, including the Gambino family whose heroine-carrying ship, the USS Poet, was commandeered by the same Iranian radicals holding the embassy hostages. That dragged P2 and the Gambinos into the hostage drama, as well as Bush, Haig and rogue elements in the already hostile-to-Carter Mossad. None of this was noted by Loftus and Aarons. Similarly, since the less authorized biographies of Maxwell were not resourced by Loftus and Aarons, one can reasonably assume they were choosing to ignore his seamier ties to worldwide intelligence groups that were often in conflict, including the Knights of Malta and apparently, based on Honnegar's research, P-2.
Haines, nevertheless, has some interesting bits and pieces (if one has sufficiently "backgrounded" this ahead of time from other sources): 21-22; 172-3 (professor Neville Postlethwaite's 1980 assessment of Maxwell); 381-7 (chronological series of events in Maxwell's career and planning of 1979-81--buyouts and financial activities that moved him toward the US); finally, 404, where Haines briefly describes Maxwell's July, 1980 "dawn raid" buy-out of British Printing Company--a company that never really made it and which was the major source of his oft-promised, sometimes-advertised, but never-delivered book "publications". One of those may have been the ad I heard in 1980 in Houston. See also photo of Maxwell with Japanese multi-millionaire Ryoichi Sasakawa, who donated £500,000 to Maxwell's firms all at once.
Halliday, Jon, and Gavan McCormack. Japanese Imperialism Today. London: Penguin, 1973. 102-3. "However it must be remembered that after the surrender a number of Japanese. . .moved over to the KMT. . ." 103n that Tsuji Masanobu had done so, and had "disappeared on a visit to Laos in 1961."
Halliday, Jon. A Political History of Japanese Capitalism. New York: Random House/Pantheon, 1975. [See reference to notes 11 and 14, above. See also, Note 9, "For Indian desertions, see David H. James, The Rise and Fall of the Japanese Empire (London: Allen and Unwin, 1951.), pp. 211-12. James, who was an officer in the Malaya Command, writes bitterly, but revealingly, that "within a few hours of the unconditional surrender of Singapore thousands of . . .disloyal troops were joining the Indian National Army. They needed no persuasion. . . ." For Indian cooperation with the Japanese during the Malaya campaign (before Singapore), see K.K. Ghosh, The Indian National Army: Second Front of the Indian Independence Movement. (Meerut: Meenakshi Prakashan, 1969) pp. 22-34. Excellent material in Joyce C. Lebra, Jungle Alliance: Japan and the Indian National Army (Singapore: Donald Moore for Asia Pacific Press, 1971.)
See, here, also Note 13: interesting comments here from Halliday in synopsizing some elements of the wartime rule and post-war behavior of Tengku Abdul Rahman. On page 143, Halliday notes: "The case of the State of Kedah in Malaya is exemplary. With the approach of the Japanese, the masses rose up against the Sultan, who fled into hiding. The Sultan's son, Tengku Abdul Rahman, later Prime Minister of Malaya and Malaysia, kidnapped his father, presented himself to the Japanese and offered his services to them to broadcast a radio appeal to the population to assist the Japanese. Abdul Rahman felt obliged to co-operate actively with the Japanese to protect his family's feudal position and try to prevent a popular uprising, which was already underway as the British retreated."
In Note 13, Halliday then says: "A valuable text on this is Yoji Akashi, "Japanese Military Administration in Malaya and the Moslem-Malays,1941-45," Asian Studies, (Manila), Vol. 7, No. 1 (April 1969).Akashi points out that Harry Miller's standard biography of the Tengku completely glosses over all this. When premier, the Tengku invited Kubata shun, the wartime (1942-43) Japanese governor of Perak, back to Malaya, in 1960; and during his state visit to Japan in 1963, held a reception in Tokyo for the Japanese who had participated in the Malaya Military Administration . . ." In Note 15, Halliday observes: "...It is extremely interesting to read Masanobu Tsuji Singapore: The Japanese Version [cited below] . . .which contains in an appendix the text of a Japanese booklet on fighting in Southeast Asia, with political indications on the struggle against European imperialisms. See also Saburo Hayashi . . . (with Alvin D. Coox) . . .[cited below] . . . Tsuji Masanobu was probably the most brilliant strategist in the Imperial Army and played a key role in planning victories in China, the Philippines and Singapore. At the end of the war he evaded capture and after several years returned to Japan. There, although listed by the British as a war criminal, he was not charged with war crimes; he later became a member of the Diet, joining the ruling Liberal Democratic Party. He disappeared just outside Vientiane, Laos, in1961, and speculation about his whereabouts has continued rife to this day. Brief biography in I. I. Morris, Nationalism and the Right Wing In Japan: A Study of Postwar Trends (London: Oxford UP, 1960), pp. 450-51; cf. Bergamini." See also copied material from this Halliday, pgs: 152; 161-2; 199; Notes pgs: 359-365, 371, 373-4.
Headden, Susan, Dana Hawkins and Jason Vest. "A Vow of Silence: Did Gold Stolen by Croation Fascists Reach the Vatican?" US News and World Report. March 30, 1998. 34-37.
Hine, H. R. J. The Knights of Malta. New Haven, CT: Yale UP, 1994, 1996. Illustrations. 257, 274fn.; 296(5). Flashing back on the fact that Standard Oil VP Joseph J. Larkin was made a Knight of Malta in 1928. This might seem nothing until one realizes, as H.R.J. Hine is noting in The Knights of Malta, that the Fascist government of Italy "set about restoring the city of the knights in Rhodes, the undertaking was celebrated by an international assembly of the knights in 1928...(Hine 255)." That book also shows me the exact appearance, via a photograph on page 270, of what one of those medallions, conceived of innocently enough in the 1700s-and usually used with total goodwill and innocence--actually was. It bears an uncanny resemblance to the Nazi Iron Cross. Photographs sprinkled throughout the text of the Maltese Cross in various formats--on flags and medallions--also reveal its closeness to the grim Nazi-allied Ustashi of Yugoslavia's flag. (It should be noted that the Knights of Malta, as an organization, was opposed to Fascism, but there were indivduals from that humanitarian organization who were clearly used by Allen Dulles for his Spring/Summer 1944 illegal negotiations with the Axis reported on by Loftus and Aarons.)
How the Guam Operation Was Conducted. Ground Self-Defense Force Staff School. Tokyo: Kambu Gakko Kiji, October-December, 1962. 1-3; 30-35; 42-45; 55; 63- 71; 80-83; 91-92; 94-96; 98-100; 105;107. One other point as to the likelihood of a plane being hideable on Guam--which is a considerably larger island than Saipan and covered with mountains and caves--is reinforced by a primary source. How the Guam Operation Was Conducted, compiled and published by the Ground Self-Defense Force staff in its October and November 1962 issues of Kambo Gakko Kiji.
(Described in an accompanying form letter by Col. Louis Metzger, USMC, as
"copy of a study made in 1962 of the Guam Operation by Japanese Self Defense
Force Team."
"The largest spring is found at the south end of Agana Swamp. (This swam
lies southeast of Agana. In the spring of 1962, a former Japanese Army's
fighting plane was found here (42)."
The report also reiterates (45) a point we've known for years: how several Japanese soldiers remained in hiding on Guam until many years after the war, until, in fact the '60s. The report makes several references to many moutains, cliffs and caves on Guam. For example, "In this vicinity [of Pigo Heights] are also remains of side-cave anti-air-raid trenchesused for storage of ammunition and provisions at that time [that is, during theJapanese occupation of Guam in the days before the US Marianas invasion]."
Intriguingly, this report also provides the official report that Hoyt noted in To the Marianas: that the overall Japanese commander for the entire Marianas was on Guam on and after June 19, 1944. Normally his base was Saipan. However, "Lt. Gen. Kobata, army commander,and his party which had been inspecting operational preparations in the Palau area since 5 June, intended to hurry back to Saipan. However, sincethe Japanese forces lost air supremacy, Kosata had to carry on his command from Guam from 19 June."
Finally, numerous sources tell us that the Marianas was a top priority toTojo, the Japanese General Staff and Emperor Hirohito. Once they were lost,Japan proper could be bombed by US planes, something that hadn't beenpossible since the US lost its just-built bases in Northern China as aresult of Chiang's betrayal of his own forces to the Japanese during thier"Ichigo Offensive" of Spring 1944. (see Smith, OSS). Prior to the departureof col. Takeda for the Marianas of early March/April, 1944, he was told bythe Japanese General Staff (clearly at the behest of Emperor Hirohitohimself):
"The Mariana Islands are Japan's final defensive line. Loss of these islands signifies Japan's surrender. Should any of these islands fall into enemy's hands, it must be recovered by all means with concentrated powers of the Army, Navy and Air Force."
Bergamini notes that, after Saipan fell, Hirohito knew the cause was lost, but kept up the facade. Going into that loss of the Marianas, however, my research suggests a lot ofdiplomatic activity, as well as military, by Japan and its American friends in those weeks of June, 1944.
*Hoyt, Edwin P. Storm Over the Gilberts: War in the Central Pacific, 1943. New York: van Nostrand, 1978; Avon, 1979, 2d ed. (Paperback). More details on the unorthodox behavior of the men of the Seventh Brigade, many of whom had ties to Allen Dulles law firm and its business affiliates.
http://www.botany.uga.edu/~westfall/planes.html
Avenger website address out of Memphis. However, I have found neither an e- mail nor 'snail" mail adddress with which to contact the webmaster. The only info given here, is that the persons in questions are apparently in Memphis. There are a couple/three things about this website address, however, that are themselves intriguing from the standpoint of my research:
1. "uga.edu/" is the e-mail/web address of University of Georgia. I am familiar with this address as I took some correspondence courses with Univ. Ga. while completing my second bachelors, the BA in History, last summer and early fall. Anyway, here's the reason this is interesting to me: these folks are "out of Memphis" according to the website info., yet they are associated with the University of Georgia. Why should Georgia, of all places, be so interested in the TBM Avneger, Bush's plane in WW2? This is just another one of those interesting coincidences I keep running across.
2. This fellow's brother is a "nationwide" old aircraft "collector." Why the focus on UGA, therefore? Why is UGA so intersted in being the vehicle via which this info. is gotten out to a wider audience? What is it about more detailed data that Georgia persons would want known? Why is it that, of all the "nationwide" contacts his brother had, UGA is the one most appealing to be used?
3. The web author describes his experiences in getting in and out of some of the planes. The most difficult one--and, indeed, the only one which was difficult enough for him to go into detail in describing--is the Russian "YAK". The TBM Avenger was apparently not that difficult to exit, at least for one individual. It's interesting to note that two persons had to exit from the hatch of Bush's Avenger at the time of Bush's alleged water landing off the Marianas during the Battle of the Philippine Sea on June 19, 1944. Also, Nadeau says that Delaney "bumped his head" on exiting that day--and was knocked unconscious or semi-conscious.
A similar event seems to have occurred during Bush's carries, the San Jacinto's, ordeal during a typhoon in August, 1944--during which Bush, Delaney and Nadeau, with the others on board the carrier. Below decks, water was very deep and they had to use rafts, etc. Some of the crewman were "bunged up" during this, according to Joe Hyams. This is the same Hyams who messed up as to the dates of certain events, such as when Dick Houle was shot down, and where (he has him shot down twice and killed both times, on two different dates and over two different islands). Hyams also confuses the date as to when Bush wrote one of the letters to his parents. It's also not clear from Hyams's account as to how the San Jac actually maneuvered, that is, what course it was on. At one point, it appears he is saying it was heading for Palau, at another, during the same time frame, for the Bonin Islands (Chi Chi Jima and Iwo Jima). Clearly, Hyams has confused things in his book For that reason, Nadeau's account of events off the Marianas June 19, 1944, may be mixed in with the typhoon-related events--including Nadeau's account of singing "Sailing, over the bounding main." Indeed, the "bounding main" is usually understood to be a reference to stormy or rough seas. Just a thought.
Anyway,this helps to explain the difficulty in accessing an Avenger. If there were something I'd chage about the chapter, it might be more aptly titled, instead of "The Credibility of Lee Nadeau"--"The Credibility of Hyams and Nadeau." I just tend to think that, between the dynamic I describe in that chapter--of Nadeau's misunderstanding of the issues and the distortion that Hyams causes in his text--that the credibility of each is weakened.
And, given that Nadeau is one of the few of Bush's squadron fellows who backs Bush's accounts of events 100%--and even he admits he "wasn't there" for at least one of Bush's flights--this is interesting. Hyams, too, was the only Bush biographer to have help from the White House staff. There are events ongoing all around the June 17-21, 1944 time-frame that are highly interesting. Not only the time frame, but the set of geographic locations we begin to see here, is interesting.
Jentleson, Bruce W. With Friends Like These: Reagan, Bush and Saddam, 1982-1990. New York: Norton, 1994. 19: "The Glaspie-Saddam meeting was not an isolated incident. It was an affirmation of, not an aberration from, existing U.S. policy. When Ambassador Glaspie told Saddam of her 'direct instructions from the President to seek better relations with Iraq,' she was acting entirely consistently with existing U.S. policy. The day before the Glaspie-Saddam meeting, Margaret Tutwiler, on of Secretary of State Baker's closest aides, told the press that 'we do not have any defense treaties with Kuwait, and there are no special defense or security commitments to Kuwait.' Later in the week, in fact just the day before Saddam actually invaded, Assistant Secretary of State John Kelly appeared to reduce the amassed Iraqi troops and tanks poised against Kuwait to a 'border dispute' and an 'internal OPEC deliberation,' the types of matters on which 'historically the United States has taken no position.'"
Jones, F.C. H. Borton, and B.R. Pearn. Survey of International Relations, 1939-44, The Far East, 1942-46. Washington, DC: United States Department of State, 1946-8. (316n) This is referred to by Herbert L. Feis in Japan Subdued (see full citation of Feis above in this Annotated Bibliography), as containing reference to a paper approved by the State-War-Navy Co-ordinating Committee (SWNCC) prepared by Dr. George H. Blakeslee and Dr. Hugh Borton "as early as the summer of 1944."(316n). This tends to tie together the reference in Bergamini (57--see the full citation for Bergamini and this referense elsewhere in this Annotated Bibliography) to Feis's data (12-18, esp. 15--see full Feis citation elsewhere in this Annotated Bibliography) and also the reference in Callahan (335) to Mr. Semerov's high regard for Mr. Forrestal, Paul Nitze's "mentor", as to his early views on a more "dovish" approach to the bombing of Japan and other matters--something on which Nitze had taken an early position on (Callahan 31-6, which includes Nitze's suspicious pro-Nazi views going into US participation in World War II--for which he was actually surveilled briefly by the FBI--and his many business ties to Forrestal and William Draper, two individuals whom we've seen are tied deeply into World War II treason activities. See also Callahan 46-7 for an interesting reference to a rather remarkable intelligence oversight on Nitze's part, when his wife Phyllis allegedly lost track of sensitive intelligence papers at a drug store. The context of Semerov's remarks to Nitze about his "mentor" Forrestal also help point to this early-on position of Forrestal that the bombing of Japan proper was something to be avoided. Nitze (Callahan 46-7) drew up a report in 1945 that called for a US military effort that avoided the bombing of Japan's home islands as much as possible. Given this notation in Feis to the "summer of 1944" SWNCC report, it's clear he was influenced in this by Forrestal, who clearly endorsed such a position in 1944--and while Dulles was trying to arrange the negotiated settlement with the Axis behind FDR's back. (See Callahan, David, Dangerous Capabilities: Paul Nitze and the Cold War , full citation for which appears in the Bibliography for Tim, George Bush and Me: "Part II: George Bush and Me" elsewhere on this website.
Josephson, Emanuel Mann. The Truth About Rockefeller, "Public Enemy Number One": A Study in Criminal Psychopathy. New York: Chedney, 1964. This book is not useful except as to a specific point of data pertaining to James V. Forrestal. On pages 162-3: "James Forrestal was closely associated with Rockefeller. As head of Dillon, Read and Co., [that company was also the company of Paul Nitze, a Carter Administration insider who may have ultimately been instrumental in the theft of Carter's debate briefing papers: Nitze had "security clearance" as a top nuclear scientist for Carter, but he was adamantly opposed to the SALT II Treaty. It's clear from his personal statements and effects that he saw the treaty as a threat to national security and would stop at nothing to get information about it. It is also clear from others' writings in the Carter Admin. that Nitze was highly-regarded and had a high security clearance--mcs..], he effected the financing of Rockefeller's German interests, including that of their I.G. Farbenindustrie [I.G. Farben produced, among other things, the poison gas used in the concentration camp "showers" and gas chambers--mcs.] A. G. office building....It was Forrestal, appointed for the purpose a special assistant in charge of inter-American affairs, who served to cover up Rockefeller's appointment to his draft-dodging, lucrative post of 'Co-ordinator.' (notes 131-2) with the help of Harry L. Hopkins and Anna Rosenberg. Forrestal turned over his position to Rockefeller, and was given the post of Assistant Secretary of the Navy. Later he became the first Secretary of Defense, where he was in a postion to sluice off arms contracts to firms controlled by his Rockefeller patrons." Much of this book is right-wing propaganda, but this specific reference is valid reference to actual documentation: 130 is "Richard Mathieu: BUDGET HEARINGS END WITH BLASTS AT ROCKY, NewYork Daily News, February 14, 1964, 18: 1."; and 131 is "Douglas Dales: AUSTERITY URGED IN STATE SPENDING, New York Times, February 14, 1964, 1: 1."
*Kido Koichi. Kido Koichi nikki. (Kido Koichi's Diaries). 2 vols. (paged consecutively). Tokyo: Tokyo UP, 1966. 951, 1005-9; 1010, 1018; 1025; 1028; 1029; 1030;. 1032; 1033-34; 1038; 1041-1043; 1056; 1057; 1088ff. (esp.); 1110-111; 1112-113;
Killian, Pamela. Barbara Bush: A Biography. New York: St. Martin's, 1992.
Kimery, Anthony. Covert Action Information Bulletin. Summer, 1992. Notes on how Bush seems to have been with the CIA even before his days at Yale. "The CIA's full-time headhunter at Yale was crew coach Allen 'Skip' Waltz, a former naval intelligence officer who had a good view of Bush. As a member of Yale's Undergraduate Athletic Association and Undergraduate Board of Deacons, Bush had to have worked closely with Waltz on the university's athletic programs from which the coach picked most of the men he steered to the CIA. It is inconceivable that Waltz didn't try to recruit Bush, say former Agency officials recruited at Yale." Also, as a student at Yale, Bush was a member of Skull and Bones Fraternity; it was also a well-known CIA recruiting ground for many years. The fact Bush didn't seem interested in being recruited at that point might suggest that Bush was, in fact, already in the CIA. It suggests, in fact, that Dulles had gotten him into the Navy in June 1942 at the age of 18 (against Naval regulations) by getting him in as an OSS Naval "impersonator." That could also explain how he got to be a reconaissance photographer. If so, this further suggests Bush did act as a courier for Dulles, given his close tie. Bush became DCI in 1976, after supposedly never having any connection to CIA previously. To have an inexperienced person in such a high-security position seems unthinkable, and it is likely it was known to the Nixon and Ford Administrations that Bush had a long OSS/CIA history. That could also further explain Nixon's strange statement about Bush during the Watergate crisis, when he taped himself saying "Bring in George Bush. He'll do anything for our cause."(Loftus and Aarons 369: "After Nixon's landslide victory in 1972, he ordered a general house cleaning on the basis of loyalty. 'Eliminate everyone,' he told John Ehrlichman about reappointments, 'except George Bush. Bush will do anything for our cause.'" These authors (599)refer to a "confidential letter, congressional staffer, enclosing undated article from The Realist" as their source here. Aside from the paranoid "our cause", what did Nixon mean by "anything"? At that time, officially George Bush had done nothing special at all for the GOP or Nixon--he'd been a politician and had served in cushy appointed positions. What "anything" had Bush done? Bush helped with Bay of Pigs, but did he do even more, even earlier--during World War II?)
Kissh, Bela. The MAORT Operation: A History of the Standard Oil Company (New Jersey) In Hungary, 1938-1948. Unpublished doctoral dissertation, University of Maryland, 1984. 177-180.
Kolko, J. and G. Limits of Power. New York: Harper and Row, 1972
*Konoye Fumimaro. Nikki (Diary). Tokyo: Kyodo Tsungshin-sha, 1968.
----------, with Uchiba Tomohiko. "Memoir," English and Japanese texts, including repetitions, rough drafts, and handwritten corrections in margins in English by the author..
Kraft, Charles Edwin. Guam, 1939-1945: American Indifference and Japanese Occupation. Portland, OR: 1961, Univ. of Oregon unpublished MA thesis.
Kramer, Michael S. and Sam Roberts. "I Never Wanted to be Vice-President of Anything!" An Investigative Biography of Nelson Rockefeller. New York: Basic, 1976. I refer to this book frequently as a good "background" text for the reader going into the 1994 discoveries cited in Loftus and Aarons (below). No specific page numbers present useful specific major scandals. World War II completely ignored (it doesn't even appear in the index). Page 2: photograph of Rocky at Presidential podium, caption: "Nelson in a characteristic pose behind a podium he does not own yet." The book is mildly critical of Rocky throughout, but the minor scandals only give a general background to the character suggested. Page 11-12: "...[H]e... signed a bill authorizing New York high schools to introduce a new course entitled 'Communism and Its Methods and Destructive Effects,' despite opposition by the State Education Department. And on April 27, 1964, Rockefeller claimed to have told Nikita Kruschev that he opposed coexistence between the United States and the Soviet Union because such a posture was'a very clever means of trying to pull us into close cooperation where they can then undermine the forces of human freedom.' On the same occasion, he was asked if the activities of Communists in the United States were not treasonable, and he answered, erroneously, that the 'Communist Party in this country has been barred for that reason.'"
Loftus, John and Mark Aarons. The Secret War Against the Jews: How Western Espionage Betrayed the Jewish People. New York: St. Martin's, 1994. Chapter 13. is the more recent of two sources of primary documents that may be useful in confirming some of the material from the Japanese end., from a closer reading of the Chapter Notes of that book ("The Final Solution Revisited"), pages 302-3; the authors make an extended reference to the "WACL: World Anti-Communist League"--in particular, of interest here, Dulles's involvement with various former Japanese WW2 Fascists. His incorporation of them into the Japanese government is detailed both in the chapter and in the chapter notes (Numbers 74-76, pages 577-8). They refer to two books, Japanese Imperialism Today, by John Halladay and Gavin McCormack (London: Penguin, 1973), and A Political History of Japanese Capitalism by John Halliday (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1975). These books provide additional insight into Dulles's ties to post-WW2 Fascists and former war criminals in Japan, supply primary sources for indications I'd found about Dulles earlier, and flesh out the picture considerably. Halliday, et al, refer to primary documents from Japan that lead to further documentation.
Making of A Dictator. Prod. Glenn Baker, Sanford Gottlieb. Washington, DC: Center for Defense Information, 1993. One videocassette (29 min.), America's Defense Monitor (television program).
Marchetti, Victor and J.D. Marks. The CIA and the Cult of Intelligence. New York: Knopf, 1974
Masanobu, Tsuji. Singapore: The Japanese Version. London: Constable and Co., 1962. In what I think is an issue related to that which was haunting Forrestal, David Bergamini, in Japan's Imperial Conspiracy, confirms my suspicions about Tsuji Masanobu. (1004-5): he was, indeed, a COURIER (yet ANOTHER courier!) between Chiang Kai Shek's forces and the Japanese, and precisely during the time when Chiang engaged in those secret negotiations that resulted in the successes of the Japanese "Ichigo offensive" which resulted in the capture of US newly-built airstrips in Northern China from which we were to at last have been able to bomb the Japanese home islands. With those airbases lost, the US had to move even faster to capture the Marianas--Guam and Saipan--from which, again, Japan proper could be reached by large, land-based bombers.
Thus, Tsuji Masanobu's apparent later communications in the postwar years with Allen Dulles--noted in an earlier e-mail by me in a reference to Loftus and Aarons--are largely confirmed. The significance of that connection is also confirmed. Dulles had, indeed, been involved in those Chiang-Japan secret negotiations. And, since Forrestal was his partner at Standard Oil, and was publicly opposed to the bombing of the Japanese home islands, HIS involvement is also clear. In A Political History of Japanese Capitalism by Jon Halliday (NY: Random, 1975), in this case, the chapter notes for "Pages 143-144", which appear on page 363-4 of the book, (note 15), make the following reference:
"...It is extremely illuminating to read Masanabu Tsuji, Singapore: The Japanese Version (London, Constable and Co., 1962), which contains in an appendix the text of a Japanese booklet on fighting in Southeast Asia, with political indications on the struggle against European imperialisms. See also Saburo Hayashi (in collaboration with Alvin D. Coox), Kogun: The Japanese Army in the Pacific War (Quantico, Va., Marine Corps Association, 1959).
"Tsuji Masanobu was probably the most brilliant strategist in the Imperial Army and played a key role in planning victories in China, the Philippines and Singapore. At the end of the war he evaded capture [my emphases--mcs] and after several years returned to Japan. There, although listed by the British as a war criminal, he was not charged with war crimes [my italics--mcs]; he later became a member of the diet, joining the ruling Liberal Democratic Party. He disappeared just outside Vientiane, Laos, in 1961, and speculation about his whereabous has continued rife to this day. Brief biography in I. I. Morris, Nationalism and the Right Wing in Japan: A Study of Post-War Trends (London, Oxford University Press, 1960), pp. 450-51; cf Bergamini, Japan's Imperial Conspiracy." Following up these sources, I've just put aside Tsuji Masanobu's book on Singapore in World War II. I got it on Interlibrary Loan at OTT. There is a possibility that what he wrote in the book, might give a clue in trying to conclude what happened to him in Laos in 1961, when he disappeared.
It's another war book--one of too many I've had to "browse through" in the past several years looking for data about this about Bush. I hate these kinds of books. There are only so many of them I can stand. They have photographs and the sum total of the human suffering just gets to be too much after awhile. Starting several months ago, I've found myself breaking down and crying periodically when I try to read about that War. I know dad could never stand to talk much about it, and Bush can't either. After you read a certain amount about it, you understand why. I just have read too many accounts, to try to get details about this Battle of the Philippine Sea when this would have happened. I got this other book by Tsuji Masanobu to try to learn more about how he thought, to see if I could figure anything out from it. But hell, I don't care how he "thought."
This fellow, Tsuji Masanobu, who wrote that book, from what I've read about him, was a creep. The whole mistreatment of the POWs, for example, largely came from him--Bataan Death March, Death Railway in Malaya (the thing about which the movie "Bridge Over the River Kwai" was made). Generals Homma and Yamashita were tried and executed for war crimes for the mistreatment of the POWs and others, but they weren't the ultimate authority--that authority came out of Tokyo, the Emperor and Tojo. They, in turn had been influenced by Tsuji Masanobu, whom they'd come to regard as "brilliant" because his manuals helped plan the surprise attacks that resulted in the early Japanese successes in the War. They turned to him for advice in the aftermath of those success, as to how to treat the POWs and others. His "brilliant" idea was to mistreat them so. His idea was almost forced onto Gens. Homma and Yamashita, who'd wanted to go more with the Geneva Convention instead. They were almost falsely convicted of war crimes in away--it should have been Tsuji Masanobu who should have been convicted. (Although they both bombed a lot of civilians, etc.) Yet, thanks to Dulles and others, Tsuji Masanobu wasn't ever put on trial for war crimes, (where he might have "spiiled the beans" about his wartime dealings with Dulles and others--they wouldn't have wanted that to come out).
Instead, he went to help Chiang Kai Shek (who, you may recall, worked widely with the Japanese during the War), in China in the civil war with Mao. Then he fled to Taiwan with Chiang's people. He lived til '61, when he disappeared in Laos. I'm thinking Dulles got rid of him--there were lots of CIA people in Laos by then, and JFK was in office, making Dulles nervous about his wartime activities coming out.
I'm not one to get emotional or share emotions, but I am trying to focus more on sources that aren't about the War itself so much, but more about the postwar period and this fellow Ivan Docheff and his ties to Laslo Pasztor and other who were couriers for the Axis in WW2. I've learned that Docheff headed the Bulgarian Legionnaires, a pro-Nazi outfit in Bulgaria that delivered messsages and so forth for the Nazis. I'm also trying to find out why Bush didn't want to get Pasztor and others booted out of the GOP, as he repeatedly declineed to do.
Those little boys so far from home and pows and in battle. It's pretty moving stuff. People being bombed and all. Surely some of those little young guys put each others' lives in danger sometimes without even knowing it.
In a way, I could let go of such a long search, for the truth here, if Bush could just make some kind of a statement that we shoud "forgive and forget." and that that's what motivated him not to try to get rid of Pasztor. I just don't know.
I feel I have an ethical responsibility to find out more about this contact the Japanese made in Bulgaria in February 1943, Was this Ivan Docheff and does that explain his continuing role in Bush's circles? Dulles was OSS station chief in Switzerland after November 1942. From Switzerland, Dulles started his long "sunrise" secret talks with the Axis, only part of which was ever officially released.
And there is that January 1944 contact in the US Japan and Chiang's agents made via a group of visiting students. "Leading Americans" told them a settlement with Japan was "reasonable". Did that group include H.L. Hunt, Rockefeller and Forrestal?
That only leaves a small, two month gap between January 1944 and Tsuji Masanobu's contacts with Chiang's people--as well as others--that led Chiang to betray his own forces during the March ,1944 Japanese "Ichigo Offensive" in Northern China, that was successful because of Chiang's treason (at whose behest?). By allowing the Japanese to capture newly-built US airfields in N. China, from which Japan could have been hit by US B-29s, that prevented the US from bombing Japan. The bombing of Japan was something Dulles opposed, as did Forrestal. Chiang didn't want the Japanese out completely until he'd defeated Mao. He always saw the Japanese as allies against Mao. So there are all these continuing connections. Each time I fill in another gap, it lessens the gap in these dates. It was such a terrible war.
That one list of Japanese language sources sent out to me from Tokyo by the Diet Library is only one list of several I have. Among the most interesting are those found in the Bibliography and Chapter Notes to David Bergamini's Japan's Imperial Conspiracy. One particular book that apparently has been translated and might be of some interest, is yet another one by Tsuji Masanobu, this one titled Undergound Escape, and cited by Bergamini as Translated from the Japanese. Tokyo: Robert Booth and Taro Fukada, 1952.
The reason this might be interesting, is that the "underground escape" of which the title speaks, is Tsuji's avoidance of the post-War War Crimes Trials in Japan. As of 1952, he'd managed to elude capture and prosecution. Halliday hints powerfully that Dulles was of assistance to Tsuji in this-- as do Loftus and Aarons. If Tsuji says so himself in this book, it would be powerful evidence suggestive that Dulles did, indeed, use him as a courier and a courier assistant during the War. My theory is that he finally killed him in Laos--had him killed by his CIA people, there in Laos, upon JFK's assumption of office.
JFK's admin. was not part of the "loop" as had been the Eisenhower. Not because Ike was in on any of this, but because Forrestal and Standard Oil just had better connections with his administration that allowed them to "mole" when needed, to get the info in or out. With JFK, that was gone.
Also, JFK was an "unknown quantity" as to his interest in pursuit of war criminals like Tsuji: would he have "bought" Dulles rationale that Tsuji had "intelligence value"? He couldn't risk Tsuji on the Stand at a trial.
Better he died silently there in Laos--which, in 1961, you may recall, was "crawling" with CIA people, due to a crisis JFK wasn't to resolve until 1962, with the three-part government of Souvana Phouma which included a capitalist, neutralist and communist. It would just have been relatively easy and simpler, from Dulles's point of view, to have Tsuji out of the way.
Perhaps the most intriguing Japanese language manuscript I've seen reference to, is Kido Koichi's Diary, titled Kido Koichi nikki ("nikki" means "diary" in Japanese). It was published by Tokyo UP in 1966, but in Japanese, with no English translation available. Lord Kido was an "insider" at Hirohito's secretive and Machiavellian Court. He knew where all the bodies were buried. If some secret deal transpired between Standard Oil and Hirohito, and if it involved a June 1944 courier mission by Bush, he probably knew about it.
That's about all I can say on this: that this name is one that would have been involved. Bergamini does mention several times in Japan's Imperial Conspiracy, however, that Lord Kido's diary is missing some material which was never recorded. A conversation with Hirohito and/or Tojo or others about a Guam courier mission from Standard Oil--would that have been recorded in his diary? It may be that it was an obscure, secondary reference--one not immediately recognizable as pertaining to such, which could explain why Bergamini and others haven't "noticed" before.
I'm still searching for the bibliographic reference to the "Dulles Letters" referred to repeatedly in the text of at least one of the recent books on Japan, but apparently it didn't appear in Bergamini's. It must have been one of the two by Halliday. The reference to the "Dulles letters" pertained to the post-war Occupation period. That, of course, would be precisely the period that might reveal Dulles to have been corresponding with Japanese he was covering for, to prevent their going on trial at War Crimes Tribunal and possibly spilling beans.
A Web search on OCLC/World Cat. is unproductive when I just use "Dulles Letters" as a title.
If I were sufficiently versed in Machiavellian details of Hirohito's court, I might also be able to make use of the "nikki" of Fumimaro Konoye, the "dove" in Hirohito's Court. It's partly in English, but its obscure references, while intriguing, may not tell me much. Tokyo: Kyodo
Tsushin-sha, 1968. "A fragment, written during the summer of 1944." Certainly an interesting time frame! Konoye also wrote, with Uchiba Tomohiko, his "Memoirs", which are English and Japanese texts "including repetitions, rough drafts, and handwritten corrections in the margins by
the author" according to Bergamini. Apparently, this latter, however, refers primarily to the Pearl Harbor attack and the very early days of the War, not to the 1944 period.
Ottenheimer has several texts up in that same area, that refer to the Occupation period of Japan. It may be that there is some mention of or reference to the "Dulles letters" manuscript in one of those. So many of those types of texts are, however, "official" and stilted in nature, not offering any really "juicy" stuff. I think, though, that I can reasonably say that, given what I've learned about this at the Japanese end, that the names involved would have been few, indeed. They would have been:
Tojo
Konoye
Kido
Hirohito
--and few others.
Intriguingly, in his book Hirohito: Behind the Myth (New York: Vintage, 1990), Edward Behr mentions that on June 26, 1944:
"...Prince Takamatsu, because of his top Navy connections, knew just how
desperate things were. Now an organic link was established between him and
Konoye, behind Hirohito's back, thanks to a mutual friend and go-between,
Morisada Hosokawa, one of Konoye's former aides who also worked as a
political contact for Takamatsu. Hosokawa relayed to Konoye, on June 26, an
alternative plan for ending the war, which, he said, had Kido's approval. . . (Behr 276)."
Since Konoye and several others had "peace drafts" floating around at that time, and had, since Saipan on June 15, Kido's ok on this more "updated" version, (post-June 19, 1944), is somewhat intriguing. Why the new twist?
Behr then notes, that this plan, too, was soon relayed to Hirohito, who was not long, Behr tells us, out of the loop on Konoye's activities with Kido and others. Tojo, by the way, offered to resign on June 20, 1944, while Bush's crew was still coming back from his alleged "water landing".
One of the key ingredients in the plan relayed by Hosokawa to Konoye above, was that Tojo would stay on as Premier only until "the next military disaster." If such a plan were, in fact, already on the books before Hosokawa transmitted it to Konoye from Kido--for example, if Kido had already discussed it with the Emperor Hirohito--then it was already around before Saipan--and before June 19, 1944. That could explain why Tojo tendered his resignation on June 20, 1944 (though it wasn't "accepted" by Hirohito until July). Tojo, by the way, though by then hardly a "hawk" himself, was replaced by Konoye and others, who were more "dovish" toward a peace settlement--with Hirohito's full knowledge and blessing.
That maneuver by the Japanese aircraft before the Marianas, during the Battle of the Philippines Sea, done by all branches of the Japanese air forces simultaneously--and completely "out of character" for the aggressive Japanese pilots-- was obviously ordered by someone in the government. No military commander alone could have ordered such a bizarre and wasteful (from a military standpoint) maneuver for planes from ALL branches. It had to have been ordered by Tojo--with Hirohito's blessing.
I mean, after all, we're talking about the Marianas here--Japan's last line, the place it had to keep the Allies from capturing, since, from there, they could begin bombing Japan proper with bombers. Japan was desperate. And money talks. Allowing Dulles an opportunity to move his
"Nazi gold" to Japanese-occupied Manchuria was a powerful incentive to get he, Rockefeller and Forrestal to negotiate. Japan needed oil. Hirohito and others had been able to manipulate Chiang Kai Shek in the past, up to the Spring of '44, to ensure the US didn't keep bomber bases in N. China, the only other place close enough from which big US B-25 land bombers could reach Japan. Chiang had betrayed his generals during Ichigo, with Japanese diplomatic cajoling, that Spring. If diplomacy had worked to spare Japan from bombing that time, perhaps it could come in handy this time, too. The stakes, from Japan's standpoint, were absolutely desperate: the difference between being bombed and not being bombed.
Going into this period of hours, too, remember, was Dulles's attempt to cooperate with Schellenberg in killing Hitler. We now know Dulles was trying to set up a new government in Germany that would declare peace with the Allies, and continuing war with Russia. Tsuji Masanobu, apparently a Dulles familiar, was also discussing the issue of keeping Japanese troops
in China to help Chiang against Mao--an issue that had ultimately led Chiang to treason once before, during Ichigo. Behr also tells us (348) that "in July 1944, the OSS had reported rumors that Hirohito was about to leave Tokyo for the comparative safety of Manchuria." That's an incredible thing, given that Dulles was then arranging to have his illicit "Nazi gold" flown there with his fake "Biskop Cikota" --that is, flown to then-still Japanese-occupied Manchuria (Manchukuo). What a "coincidence"!
Over this 48 hour period, then, a lot of "diplomacy" was going on, most of it unknown to FDR--and unauthorized by him. Of course, he'd have wanted to kill Hitler, but above all, FDR would have required a follow-up "unconditional surrender" by Germany, not what FDR would have termed "footsy" as Dulles was "playing, " to betray Russia.
Incredible and intriguing -- Machiavellian as well! And then Dulles went on, after the War, to become head of CIA for many years--as did his cohort, James Forrestal become head of ONI and Navy and then Defense! Excellent positions for a cover-up. Finally, topping it all off, Prescott, Sr., was a Senator in the '50s and '60s, and George Bush became CIA Director in the '70s, then VP and Pres., in the '80s. While Pres, (as we recall from Loftus and Aarons) he engaged in a secret surveillance of ALL American Jews--something Hitler would have envied. And this (in "70 Greatest Conspiracies", 105-110) about possible Bush family associate and Reagan would-be assassin Hinckley meeting with the heads of the American Nazi Party only a few months before he shot Reagan--and Bush's continued association with treason heir William Stamps Farrish III and his promotion of Axis couriers Laszlo Pastor and Ivan Docheff (in Inside the League, Loftus and Aarons, and Christopher Simpson's Blowback--as well as Bellant's Report). So many coincidences--only one George Herbert Walker Bush.
*---------.Underground Escape. Translated from the Japanese. Tokyo: Robert Booth and Taro Fakuda, 1952. The book presents a map of Masanobu's escape from China and Burma, where he was assigned during the closing days of the War. His route took him from the wilds of northern Burma down the Salween River to Rangoon, then into Siam (Thailand), to Ubon and Vientiane in Laos; from there, he traveled to Savannakhet in Laos, then on into Hue in Central Vietnam, north into formerly Japanese-occupied (and before that, Vichy) northern Vietnam: Vinh and Hanoi. He then travelled further north, toward Kunming, Chungking, Ichang, Hankow, Nanking, Shanghai, then to a steamer by sea to Tsingtao and Japan. And, in his Foreword, Masanobu tells us the heroic way he achieved the immediate stages of this escape: "I changed my uniform for the garb of a priest and let myself be swallowed into the great Asian continent." (2)My contempt for this individual prevents me from taking much note of his highly-opinionated commentary along the way. He repeatedly emphasizes the horrible state of a China divided by the Mao-Chiang civil war and how Chiang will lose because of Chiang's corruption. The bottom line is that he ended up in Japan, and somehow evaded prosecution as a war criminal. As noted before, a key element to the latter may very well have been his ties to Allen Dulles and his brother, carved during the War itself. At the end of his Foreword, Masanobu notes his book is being published: "January 25, 1951, upon the eve of Japan's greeting Ambassador John Foster Dulles". A paragraph above that, making note of the then-ongoing Korean War, he noted: "Perhaps I am not alone in my presentiments of threatening clouds that might split Japan into two camps and bring down torrents of blood. Which should be all preceding--'isms' ideologies or the common feelings of a common race?" Dulles--and his fervent anti-Communism--was obviously strongly in his mind at that time. Disappointingly, the text ends too early in time to tell whether Dulles proved a valuable link to Masanobu in avoiding War Crimes prosecution, but he's clearly looking forward to his visit in this reference.
Mayer, Jane and Doyle McManus. Landslide: The Unmaking of the President, 1984- 1988. Boston: 1988, Houghton-Mifflin. 4-8; 11-17; 30-34; 61-3; 193-199; 200; 358-60; 388-392.
*Merrill, Frederick T. Japan and the Opium Menace. New York: Institute of Pacific Relations and the Foreign Policy Association, 1942. Published just as America's involvement in World War II was beginning, Merrill's excellently-researched book provides valuable insights into the level of official Japanese government sanctioning of and participation in the distribution of heroin, opium and morphine in the cities and streets of Asia, most specifically China, in the late thirties, following its invasion of the Chinese mainland. Chapters of particular interest include: "The Opium Menace in China", "Opium and Narcotics Drugs in China Since the Japanese Invasion", "Smuggling Bases--Hong Kong, Macao and Kwangchowwan", "Narcotics in Japan", "Opium Problems in Japanese Dependencies", and "Widespread Use of Narcotics in Manchuria". Also of interest is "Annex III" in the back of the book, titled "The Japanese Opium Racket in Central China" by Anthony Smith:
"The main characteristics of the opium situation in the Japanese-occupied areas of Central China in the early days of May, 1938, can be summarized as follows:
"(1)The activity of all of the anti-opium agencies as installed by China's national government has been practically suspended through interference either by the Japanese themselves or by the bogus Chinese authorities set up by them.
"(2)The import of opium, heroin and other narcotics has become completely free. Huge quantities of narcotics of all sorts are imported, in particular from Japanese-controlled Dairen and Tientsin.
"(3) Opium and other narcoticsw are freely distributed all over the areas in question, and are being openly marketed in many formerly almost completely opium-free districts and cities, as, for instance, Nanking.
"(4)This opium business is concentrated in the hands of a series of Japanese and Korean opium rings, powerful through their intimate relations with the Japanese authorities and with the local bogus authorities set up by them. Newly organized Chinese opium gangs have been placed in control of distribution in whole cities, as, for instance, in Soochow.
"(5)In the retail trade in opium and other narcotics are employed the lowest strata of the Chinese population and of the Japanese colony in Shanghai, many of them criminals. A special feature of this retail trade is the frequent employment of professional prostitutes of both nationalities, or from ruined Chinese women who have been taken along by the Japanese soldiery.
"(6)The bogus authorities set up by the Japanese are collecting revenue from the narcotic trade, either openly through the licensing of opium smoking, or through levies of contributions from the dominating opium rings. Many local Chinese officials receive their rewards through direct participation in the narcotic trade.'
"(7)Opium and other narcotics are forced upon non-addicts and unwilling people. There is propaganda for the consumption of narcotics, and Chinese workers frequently receive part of their payment in the form of narcotics.
"(8)As a consequence of this situation, the consumption of opium and other narcotics is rapidly increasing, and addiction to narcotics is widely spreading." (Merrill 158).
In "Annex IV: Report on the Narcotic Trade in Nanking" by Dr. M.S. Bates, some interesting quotations include: "The present generation has not known large supply and consumption of opium in Nanking, nor open sale in a wasy to attract the poor and ignorant. Particularly durign the last five years has the use of opium been slight, due to fairly consistent and cumulative government pressure against the trade, plus the educational effort during the past thirty years. Heroin was practically unknown.
"But the changes of the year 1938 have brought an evil revolution. today opium and heroin are abundantly supplied by the public authorities or those who enjoy their favor and protection. . .Licensed dens in the public system advertise upon the streets that their products increase the health and vigor of those who use them. . ." (Merrill 159: this, be it noted, is after Nanking's conquest by Japan.)
"Destructive and alarming as is the trade in opium, it is overshadowed in viciousnes, perhaps roughly equaled in monetary volumne, and probably surpassed in number of persons affected by the totally new development of heroin.
"Heroin is more convenient to take and a very small quantity is effective . . .A sensible private estimate is that 50,000 persons, one-eighth of the Nanking population, are now users of heroin. . .It is commonly reported that the Special Service Department of the Japanese Army has close and protective relatiions with the semi-origanized trade in heroin. . . There is general testimony that a good deal of the wholesale trade is carried on by Japanese firms which outwardly deal in thinned goods or medicines, but handle heroin through rooms in the rear. . ."(Merrill 161).
er quotes of interest earlier in Merrill's text include:
r the past two decades, Japanese, Korean and Formosan gangsters have been offering their nefarious wares in many parts of China. This situation has recently been widely publicized, and has played an important part in arousing feeling both within and outside China against Japan. One hundred years ago, Great Britain had been supplying the Chinese people with opium. Thirty years ago, France, England, Switzerland and Germany in addition to the United States were permitting their surplus manufacture of narcotic drugs to find its way to the Orient. [In a footnote to this point, Merrill notes: "The export of manufactured drugs from the US was prohibited after 1914." This is particularly interesting: immediately presaging WWI, with its huge increase in morphine addictions in Europe--mcs.]Today these abuses against China have ceased, due mostly to public revulsion against such a trade and the pressure brought to bear through the League of Nations. Japan alone has made no successful efforts to prevent her nationals from engaging in the narcotic trade in China. . ."(Merrill 36).
"In 1937 after the Japanese had evacuated Hankow, the remains of a morphine manufacturing plant were discovered at their Concession..."(Merrill 37).
". . . [I]n other sections of China, where the Central Government's authority has been weak, the Chinese themselves have often been involved in the drug traffic... Chinese addicts continued to find a source fo the drug within China itself. Clandestine manufacture of morphine cropped up not only in the coastal cities but even in the interior provinces...Chinese peddlers were often apprehended, but were usually discovered to be in the pay of a Japanese or a Korean...In North China during the five years from 1932 to 1937 when the Japanese Army was extending its influence south of the Great Wall, Korean drug peddlers were extremely active...During these years the Japanese Concession in Tientsin became the headquarters for a vast opium and narcotic drug industry...By 1937 fully one-tenth of the population of Teintsin was addicted to narcotic drugs...Several large exporting drug rings also operated in the Japanese Concession...The majority of these drug syndicates were registered as Japanese firms...In Peking seventy drug 'joints'...located mostly near the Japanese Legation Guard in the East City...a dozen houses...representing the Manchukoan [Manchuko was the Japanese name for Japanese-occupied Manchuria, home, we recall, of Allen Dulles's illegal courier network of 1944-5--mcs] Opium Monopoly in Jehol...The so-called 'demilitarized zone' between Hopei province and Manchukuo was described as a vast drug reservoir for North China. Hundreds of drug shops had sprung up...nearly all run by Japanese and Koreans...Backed by the Kwantung Army, the Japanese and Korean traffickers openly challenged the Chinese police and authorities and resisted with arms any interference with their trade...It must thus be concluded that before the outbreak of war between China and Japan in the summer of 1937, the Central Government was making sincere and effective efforts to eradicate opium from teh country..."(Merrill 38-41).
"The outbreak of the war between China and Japan...abruptly interrupted progress toward the goal of opium suppression...As the Nanking government withdrew into the interior and the Japanese army effectivel occupied the coastal areas, the sale of opium gradually fell into the hands of Japanese agents. Since that time the consumption of heroin in occupied China has not only ceased to be controlled but has been actually encouraged. Most ominous, however, is the ever-increasing use of opium revenues to support the Japanese inspired regimes..."(Merrill 42).
"On paper...China has now completed the campaign against opium addiction. Nevertheless, several million addicts are still uncured and Chinese authorities are unduly optimistic to believe that these inveterate smokers will give up the habit as long as there remains any possibility of access to opium or the drugs which are a substitute for it...Opium from Japanese occupied China, which had previously been cleared of poppies, seeps into Free China areas...There is no doubt that both opium smoking and drug addiction have increased in occupied China, while there has been a recurdescence of poppy cultivation in provinces where it had previously been eradicated. Many Chinese in the occupied areas, no longer in touch with the Chungking government and its New Life movement, have reverted to narcotics..."(Merrill 48).
"The sale of opium is closely supervised by the government of (occupied) North China...On October 1, 1940, the North China Political Affairs Commission, the puppet government of Wang I-tang, set up a super Suppression Bureau for the purpose of consolidating all opium traffic. Ths North China Opium Suppression Bureau has nine branches...Its operating personnel is all Japanese and it is reported that profits are shared with the Japanese military..."(Merrill 50).
"The political subdivision and control of Inner Mongolia by the Kwantung Army has...been accompanied by an increase in opium production...The opium monopoly is handled by the Mongolian Opium Company, Ltd., which has been organized by the Japanese army for the benefit of the "Mongolian United Autonomous Government..."(Merrill 52-3).
"The provinces of Shantung and Honan were evacuated by Japanese peddlers during the latter part of 1937, but they returned with the Japanese Army the following year...The United States Government representative in 1939 received information taht in Tsinan, after the Japanese occupation, the Consolidated Tax Bureau was permitting the sale of opium publicly..."(Merrill 54).
"One survey taken late in 1938 by a group of twenty foreigners, disclosed that crime, prostitution, gambling and opium were flourishing [in Japanese-occupied cities].In Canton, although the opium was offered freely and at low prices, sales at that time were small since only athe very destitute still remained in the city. Now, however, a recent report maintains that there are 852 registered dens and numerous other holes in the wall selling drugs and opium dross to coolies. Iranian opium is abundant[emphasis added]..."(Merrill 60).
"IN addition to the declared importation into Macao of opium from Iran, it was stated that much greater quantities were continually imported, either for the illegal manufacture of prepared opium or for re-export to certain Japanese interests. Two Japanese companies were said to have been implicated in the purchase of Iranian opium in Macao...On April 3, 1938, a shipment of 1100 chests of Iranian opium was landed at Hak Sha Wan near Macao from an armed Japanese vessel...IN May 1940 both the Opium Advisory Committee and the Permanent Central Board heard statements from Portuguese representatives describing various measures adopted by the Macao government for both supervising and combating the illicit traffic and drug addiction in the colony...However, measures of reform have been promised by the Portuguese government for many years. The measures adopted have never been effective."(Merrill 67). [The close time-frame here to the Iranian and Iraqi pro-Axis coup attempts of the summer of 1941 is intriguing, when we recall the data cited elsewhere on this Site that Japan was also a sponsor of those 1941 coup attempts--mcs].
Morris, I. I. Nationalism and the Right Wing In Japan: A Study of Postwar Trends London: Oxford UP, 1960. 49-53; 72-79; 450-451. (Note 15 in Halliday's Political History of Japanese Capitalism:) "Tsuji Masanobu was probably the most brilliant strategist in the Imperial Army and played a key role in planning victories in China, the Philippines and Singapore. At the end of the war he EVADED CAPTURE [my emphases--mcs] and after several years returned to Japan. There, Although listed by the British as a war criminal, he was not charged with war crimes [emphasis added--mcs]; he later became a member of the Diet, joining the ruling Liberal Democratic Party. HE DISAPPEARED just outside Vientiane, Laos, in 1961, and speculation about his whereabous has continued rife to this day. Brief biography in I. I. Morris, Nationalism and the Right Wing in Japan: A Study of Post-War Trends (London, Oxford University Press, 1960), pp. 450-51."
Mountbatten, Lord Louis, Vice Admiral the Earl of Burma. Report to the Combined Chiefs of Staff by the Supreme Allied Commander Southeast Asia 1943-1945. London: 1951, Royal Stationery Office. iii; 42-51; 55; 57-59; 61-63; 66-67; 74; 76; 79; 85; 87-88; 94-95.
O'Brien, Cyril J. Liberation: Marines in the Recapture of Guam. Washington, DC: History and Museums Division, Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, 1994
Ornstein, Norman J. "The November 6 Vote for President: What Did It Mean?" Austin Ranney, ed. American Elections of 1984. Durham, NC: Duke UP, 1985. 213.
Orr, Bill. "Amelia Earhart and the Radio Amateurs," CQ. April 1998, 52-3.
OSS. Indian Nationals in Japan. (Microfilm). Washington, DC. 1944: State Department OSS. 7, 10, 17, 40. Also specific circled quoted intercepts and broadcasts as listed by date, based on radio broadcasts as well as intecepts.
Pacific Flyer magazine. online. website. http://www.landings.com/_landings/pacflyer/apr8- 1999/An-04-Upcoming-event.html
Pertaining to Lee Nadeau. Nadeau made a talk in Calif., April, 1999, "Bill James" a contact point for getting tickets to the function. 619-273-1874. I have a feeling he won't know anything about a contact point for Nadeau--just a ticket man.
"Papers Reveal British Plot to Kill Hitler, " by Richard Norton-Taylor (for The Guardian, London.) Arkansas Democrat-Gazette, July 23, 1998. Repr. frm. Guardian. Interesting data as to ongoing OSS and British interest in killing Hitler toward the close of the War and also how this ended upon FDR's death. Reasserts that killing Hitler was not really official policy.
Parry, Robert. October Surprise X-Files: The Hidden Origins of the Reagan-Bush Era. Arlington, VA: Media Consortium, 1996, 1997. 48-9; 84-6; 108-18 Latest updates on Parry's research, interesting discoveries pertaining to the Rockefellers' ties to the Irangate scandal. This has implications for my research as well, since it provides further evidence of an ongoing interest by Big Oil in the activities of Iran and Iraq. Khomeini went back to the 1941 era, as did the Ba'ath Party's founders. Prescott Bush's activities should be described as "read: Rockefeller" since the latter tended to be the former's partner or boss. Similarly, Rockefeller ties to the October Surprise allegations further increase the likelihood that this "tangled web" included Prescott, sr., in it, going back to that 1941 Iraqi coup.
*-------. Trick or Treason: The October Surprise. New York: Sheridan Square, 1993. Source for the Frontline documentary of 1991, Parry went on to broaden and update his research.
*Pool, James and Suzanne. Who Financed Hitler: The Secret Funding of Hitler's Rise to Power, 1919-1933. Carson City, NV: America West, 1995.
Ranney, Austin, ed. American Elections of 1984. Durham, NC: Duke UP, 1985. 40, 40, Table 2.5; 41, 41, Table 2.6; 211, 211, Table 7.2; 213; 231, 231, Table 7.5; 232, 232, Table 7.5 (cont.); 250.
*Reed, Terry and John Cummings. Compromised: Clinton, Bush and the CIA. Carson City, NV: America West, 1996.
*Reich, Carey. The Life of Nelson A. Rockefeller. New York: Doubleday, 1996.
*Saburo Hayashi and Alvin D. Coox. Kogun: the Japanese Army in the Pacific War. Quantico, Va.: Marine Corps Association, 1959.
*Sayer, Ian and Douglas Botting. Nazi Gold: The World's Greatest Robbery and Its Aftermath. NY: Congdon and Weed, 1984, 1998.
*Shigemitsu Toshihiko. Japan and Her Destiny: My Struggle for Peace. New York: E.P. Dutton, 1958. 287-290. 293-94.
Simpson, Christopher. National Security Directives of the Reagan and Bush Administrations: The Declassified History of United States Political and Military Policy, 1981-1991. San Francisco: Westview, 1995. 9,19 ("NSDD1");10; 894-5. Alexander Haig was the only pro-Israel Cabinet member in the Reagan Administration, according to Loftus and Aarons. Haig, in his memoir Caveat, talks at length about the confusion and double messages he got as Secretary of State. Early in the Administration, Bush put pressure on for Haig to be removed. He undercut Haig in every way he could. Haig competed with Bush for clearance to have immediate access to the Red Phone in the immediate minutes after a presidential injury or assassination.It has generally been understood since the Red Phone came into existence that this role must be delegated by the President, since the Vice-President must be sworn in and this takes a few minutes: in the meantime, the Red Phone must still be attended.
That was part of what NSDD1 was all about. There were two versions of it, Haig's and Bush's, neither of which had clearly been signed on the day, (March 30, 1981), that Reagan was shot. They were in his briefcase as "pending" items that day. Or, could it be that one version had been signed, after all? Bush alone, of all US Vice-Presidents of this era, seems hung up on this point, determined not to let anyone else access the Red Phone, especially pro-Israel Haig, whom he and James Baker subsequently got hounded out of Reagan's Cabinet. Several other issues were addressed by NSDD1, of course, including the sequence of several diplomatic overtures and the disposition of various "emergency" aspects of the US government (at the very least, at the time of the shooting of a President). Bush seemed to have been uncomfortable with an "Israeli" having that power.
Simpson's book, released in 1995, makes it clear that NSDD1 is still "classified." Why? It was only the very first of many National Security Directives. Why are so many of the others declassified, but it remains classified? Could it be that "Haig's version" is the one Reagan actually signed off on, and that that is why Reagan is alive today?
Interestingly, as long as NSDD1 is still classified, Haig cannot comment.
Intriguingly, too, Haig was the only Cabinet member to suggest an investigation be conducted to determine if Reagan's shooting had been part of a conspiracy. In defiance of Bush, he conducted several minutes of dialog with other Cabinet members that day, after Bush had arrived back in Washington and said that there would be "no investigation of any conspiracy." In Caveat, he barely mentions this--though he does mention it. Regan, in his own memoirs, reveals the Cabinet "as a whole" was ready to accept Bush's decision immediately, without mentioning Haig. Haig alone was hesitant. He left the Administration in 1982, after "hearing over the radio" that he'd been fired and not being able to get a clear line to the President to ask if it was so. By the way, too, in a different but related topic from the book, on the day Reagan was shot: NSDD1, the first National Security Directive pertaining to order of access the Red Phone: Haig and Bush each submitted a "version" to Reagan. What was in Haig's version? Couldn't find out: unlike virtually all the rest of Reagan/Bush NSDD's right up to 1993, this one is still classified. Did it include a reference (in Haig's version) to the first edition of The Immaculate Deception--the book I heard advertised on the radio in Houston?
*Smith, Gen. Holland. Coral and Brass. NY: Scribner's, 1949. More on the cotroversies surrounding Naval reconnaisance photography in the Pacific Islands campaign.
Stinnett, Robert. George Bush: His World War II Years. DC: Brassey's, 1992. 22, 36, 40, 45, 46, 47, 48, 61, 62, 63, 68, 69, 73, 74, 74-5, 76, 77,78, 79, 80, 81, 82, 83, 84-5, 103, 111, 112-13, 114, 143, 152, 153, 157, 159, 160, 161, 169, 191, 192, 193, 194, 195, 196, 197, 198, 199, 200, 201, 202, 203, 208. 36--"Beauty" Martin complains about the quality and level of training of Bush's group on first going into combat; 45-7, 62-3, 69: Leo "Lee" Nadeau's problems and court-martial, June 25, 1944 over his hesitance and refusal to fly with Bush due to "jinx" theories he'd developed; 61--photo of Bush's VT-51 Squadron in its usual flying position, Commander Don Melvin's plane (with Mierzejewski as tail turret gunner) immediately ahead of Bush's plane, which was in final or "sniffer" position; according to Stinnett and his sources, however, this was not the position of Bush's plane during the Chi Chi Jima raid ("Strike Baker") when the planes were reshuffled into a different formation, leading, according to Stinnett, to Ski's confusion as to how close he was to Bush's plane; 73-85, somewhat detailed account of Bush and crews locations and activities on June 19-25, the period of time in which Bush allegedly water landed "20 miles west of Guam" (74): this event (or at least the water crash of a TBM Avenger) is noted by Stinnett to have been recorded by USS Clarence K. Bronson deck officer Lt. Richard Patterson as 1:09, with pickup of its three-man crew 8 minutes later (1317); this identical hour is recorded by Stinnett on June 23, when the whaleboat of the USS Healy brings the three man crew of a Japanese plane to the USS Lexington, on which Bush and his crew were by then located. Stinnett here also records that "Bush and" his crew saw the Japanese POW with his "heavily bandaged" head, while only later is it recorded that the ship's medic bound the Japanese's (identified by Stinnett via detailed research as Petty Officer Toyota) head. It's impossible to tell how much of this is the crew's recollection, how much Bush's, how much Nadeau's. But, given the fact that Ted White was Bush's "childhood friend" (according to Stinnett himself) and given Nadeau's "jinx theory" which is recorded repeatedly going into and after the June 19 date, it is not so impossible to theorize that White was on the June 19 flight instead of Nadeau, as he was over Chi Chi Jima, especially given the emergency take-off, at which he may have balked. That, in turn, puts his versions of events that day into question. Given that Patterson is not cited as an interview by Stinnett, and that there is not further information provided to the as to Patterson's subsequent fate and whereabouts--even though this is provided for virtually every other person cited in the text by Stinnett--we must assume Stinnett is relying here on the deck log of the CK Bronson (cited by Stinnett under "National Archives and Records Center in Washington, DC"--an interesting source in itself, given our other findings as to the suspicious activities of former Bush Administration Archivist Don Wilson in possibly excerpting key files there during the Iraq-gate investigation), and the accounts of Bush and Nadeau. So, though detailed, much of that detail comes from Bush and Nadeau, not Patterson verbatim.
It is impossible to know, too, how much of the account of the USS Healy's whaleboat-load of Japanese plane crew is based on crewmen's accounts, and how much on Bush and Nadeau's. Several photos are presented, but interestingly show several people on the whaleboat, from a position looking down from ondeck of the Healy. These photos only raise as many questions as they answer: was Bush on that whaleboat? How many people were actually picked up by it? And where? The exact same time recorded for both the Healy's whaleboat pickup and the CK Bronson's Avenger pickup--1317 hours and a few days apart--suggests a few things, given what we've learned.
It suggests, for one thing, more of that confusion of records we've noted repeatedly in connection with Bush's activities, going through Hyams's inability to tell us the time and location of Dick Houle's death to the whereabouts of Bush's Secret Service party on October 20,1980. It suggests, also, the possibility that Bush was picked up by the whaleboat that pulled the Japanese out of the water. Though he wasn't on Toyota's Iwo Jima-based aircraft, he was in the waters close by--either he or Delaney, who almost appears to be in the whaleboat in one of the photos taken of the whaleboat. But if Delaney were picked up separately from Bush and Nadeau (read: White instead of Nadeau, if my scenario is correct), why would this be so? How could he have gotten separated? Was he adrift in Marianas waters for some period of time after Bush and White (officially Nadeau) were picked up on June 19 at "1317"? Could the "1317" exact time be a manifestation of someone's recollection that some "connection" occurred?
Intriguingly, in connection to the absence of records of the San Jac and other key ships and persons in regard to all of this, Stinnett notes (202) that "many of the torpedo squadron (VT-51) log books and records were destroyed in a fire at the Naval Air Station, Pasco, Washington in 1945.
78: Stinnett here is showing Nadeau's flight record which includes Nadeau's citing of the fact that the flight of June 19, 1944 last "1.5 hours". Yet, Nadeau's account in Stinnett says they took off at 1157 hours and that the CK Bronson's log records them being picked up at 1310 hours. That's an hour and thirteen minutes. That's twenty minutes less than Nadeau's original record, and Nadeau's original record itself appears to be about another twenty minutes shorter than the official accounts from Hoyt would suggest for this time period. It would appear that the actual take-off time, which Nadeau says was 1157, but which he is also saying was, in effect, about an hour and a half before 1310, or 1140. But we've seen that a general quarters alarm had been sounded at 10, and that all crews were in their planes on the San Jac by 10:15, according to Stinnett's own account. Then, priority was given to launch all fighters, per Admiral Mitscher's order of 10:20, cited by Hoyt (150), while his accompanying order to "clear the decks of bombers" was clearly interpretable--and interpreted--as meaning to launch all bombers as soon as all fighters were in the air. That means that, given the fact all crews were already aboard, and that Bush's bomber had already been loaded before the air raid siren sounded, they were ready for a take-off of bombers by about twenty minutes after 10:20, or 10:40. Even if some other bombers were launched first, this suggests that it was about 10:50 to 11 when Bush's bomber was actually launched. Nadeau's original time of 1.5 hours, would suggest 1140 as the takeoff time, but this, again, is twenty minutes or so later than the actual takeoff time even could have been, given the emergency reason for the takeoff. Why? Because Hoyt is telling us that the main Japanese raids that set off the alarms arrived over the ships by about 10:15. Giving that precious few minutes that the Japanese orbit maneuver did that time, (Hoyt gives this as 15 minutes) that means the fighters were off the decks by 10:30 and the bombers were already being catapulted off the San Jac by 10:40. Again, allowing a few bombers ahead of Bush and crew's own bomber, even another 20 minutes (Stinnett and Hyams say the San Jac had to "turn into the wind" but it's clear it was already into the wind or the fighters couldn't have been launched, so even that little ten to fifteen minutes is accounted for and doesn't need to be added in.) So the only time required is the actual catapult launch time for up to five other bombers, or about five minute apiece, twenty to twenty five minutes, probably not even that long, since more than two could be launched simultaneously from the catapults. So we're talking about ten minutes here. Ten minutes after 10:40 puts the time at 10:50. So Nadeau's launch time is an hour off--meaning the flight time he has written couldn't be based on firsthand information, but on Bush's data given to Nadeau afterward. (Bush has also corrected Nadeau's name of the destroyer they were picked up by from USS Bronson to "Clarence P. Bronson" in this flight record. Thus, they were in the air from 10:50 until 1:10, or, well over two hours--that is, they had left the carrier deck over two hours before they were seen again. And we have contradictory accounts as to what they did, why the plane acted up and when it acted up.
I hope the significance or possible significance of this has not been lost on you--I mean, I hope that I've described this effectively enough. This over two hour period of being missing, combined with Nadeau's court-martial on June 25 based on Delaney's complaint about his number 13 Jinx theory, the fact the "Barbara's" number added up to 13, something Stinnett notes that Nadeau had noticed on all the other planes (why wouldn't he have also noticed it on the Barbara' itself?), and that this was the 13th combat flight of the month, all fit well into Nadeau's jinx theory and, given the quick, emergency take-off and emergency general quarters alarms, suggest Nadeau waited slightly too long to get on the plane. The question would be, did he keep Delaney off the plane, too? That seems answered by the fact that someone in the Barbara's crew, not Bush, filed the complaint about Nadeau's jinx theory, for which he was court-martialed on June 25 (Bush defending him). Delaney's reason for complaint? Because he'd been kept off the plane, but Bush convinced him to limit the complaint, and not mention Nadeau's not being on the plane on the 19th nor his keeping Delaney off of it, too--but only that the "theory" inconvenienced him or constituted insubordination. And who would be other two persons have been? Ted White is strongly suggested and Nadeau's stand-in; the other, is Robert Stinnett himself, an ONI and official Navy photographer. Though Stinnett asserts the photo of Houle's plane water landing "in sight" of the CK Bronson (June 16--per Hyams--June 19--per that being the date of the Battle of the Philippines Sea--or June 20--per Stinnett?), was taken by himself, he also admits he was only one of three official San Jac photographers, and that there was a San Jac "photo collection." Hence, it is almost photographically verifiable that the plane the CK Bronson log is talking about seeing water landing at 1309 hours, is actually Houle's plane! And it is almost verifiable, drawing on existing sources and drawing rational conclusions as to who filed the complaint against Nadeau (it HAD to have been Delaney--he was the only other person affected by it, since Bush didn't file it) that someone in Bush's plane was inconvenienced in the carrying out of his duties by Nadeau's actions, hence the complaint's being filed in the first place.
So we have a two-hour time period, a suspicion that at least one regular crew member (Nadeau) who claims to have been there, wasn't really there, a likely candidate as his replacement, an iffy date for Houle's crash, and the likelihood that an ONI photographer, Stinnett, could have been Delaney's replacement. We have an impossible account in Hyams, an official Bush biographer working with the White House staff, given these times (and it should be noted that Hyams is silent as to a take-off time), as to how early the plane was malfunctioning, (according to him--80-3--before they ever took off). Stinnett says the plane didn't malfunction until after they'd climbed to 1500 feet and had flown through a cloud of shrapnel. He also notes two small speck-like aircraft on the horizon behind the Enterprise as likely to have been Bush's plane (that is, one of the two). But if one plane is Bush's, whose plane is the other one? There is clearly another plane. Is it Houle's? If it is, that means the date Stinnett is giving for Houle's crash is off--that Houle did, indeed, crash on the 19th.
Also, if one of the planes is Houle's, it doesn't necessarily mean the other one is Bush's. Indeed, using the circular logic that seems to be used by the sources and staffs at times, the arrival at the conclusion that it was even possibly Bush's plane, might ORIGINALLY have been based on the fact that one plane was Houle's and they'd both water-landed during the Battle of the Philippines Sea, which was a two-day battle, lasting from June 19 (mostly fought on June 19) and resuming for a few of the morning hours of June 20. But, if one plane is Houle's, it was in the afternoon, not the morning, when these planes were photographed on the horizon. That means it wasn't the 20th, but the 19th!
So, by using logic--difficult to apply in all this information and contradiction, one arrives at a very sobering conclusion: George Bush took off at shortly before 11 am on June 19, 1944 in a plane that supposedly was malfunctioning before he ever took off in it (per Hyams) and remained out of sight of his carrier until after 1:00 pm--over two hours. He is said by Stinnett to have climbed to 1500 feet and through a cloud of shrapnel before developing plane problems. Thus, all these accounts, can't be accurate, and we're left with a two hour-plus time period to account for. We also have this intriguing information about how Bush seemingly didn't know how to water-land an aircraft, because of the way he passed up an excellent opportunity to do so over Chi Chi Jima island later, on September 2, 1944. Not only Mierzejewski, but now Joe Foshee also, are saying they never say any fire, only smoke from Bush's plane. And if there was no fire, according to the pilots involved, you were supposed to water land, to give your crew the best chance to escape. Also, Bush told "Ski" that both crewmen were dead when he bailed out, but he told Tom Keene on the Finback that he'd seen on try to bail out. So there are problems with George Bush on June 19, 1944. Did he ever water land? Could he really have even successfully water landed with four five-hundred pound depth charges under his wings? Hoyt gives an account of a plane in a very similar situation on the same day, same battle, which exploded on impact with the water because it came in from the wrong angle. And Bush had never water-landed before, (assuming he did so, that day).
Very intriguing. More conflicting data, conflicting times. Hyams versus Stinnett, Hoyt versus the older account by Crowl, Hyams versus Hyams, Nadeau versus Nadeau, and Stinnett versus Stinnett; Bush versus "Ski" and, apparently, Joe Foshee, too; and, perhaps most clearly suggested underneath all of this, Bush versus Bush. And, in the background, Bush's father selling oil to the Axis, his partner Forrestal under surveillance, along with Bush's father's attorney, who is also selling them oil and simultaneously trying to negotiate with them illegally without FDR's knowledge--and who is also, per Loftus and Aarons, by this time using couriers to communicate with them. A few months after this, he flies Bishop Cikota into Japanese-occupied Manchuria. To have done so in the clear, he had to have communicated this to them ahead of time. That, in turn, required his use of a courier. A prime candidate for such a courier, was Prescott's son.
This new information, just keeps filling in more blanks and making these questions as to Bush's whereabouts during this two hour time period, more difficult to account for by any other way than the scenario of his having landed on Guam.
I know you won't read this until after Spring Break, but I wanted to jot this down before I "lost" it. I'm adding this to the Annotated Bibliography for the Part II manuscript, but I am copying it to you in this e-mail. I hope you see the possible significance. Once again, that same question crops up for this date, as it did on November 22, 1963 and on October 19, 1980: WHERE WAS GEORGE?
103, 111-14: data on the disputed quality of the aerial photos going into Saipan and, later, Peleliu in the Palaus--and on the reprimand given Bush's immediate commanders for a security violation in regard to the latter photos. Stinnett may be correct as to the Saipan photos (I can't dispute this point due to lack of data) but he is unconvincing as to the Peleliu photos: Maj. Gen. Rupertus and other Marine commanders complained that the photos had been "tied up in the chain of command" and denied to the lower-level Marine commanders. Stinnett maintains that this is not true, that Rupertus's own staff, especially Lt. Pasto's map-making based on those photos of July 26-7, 1944 which technically were available to Rupertus well before Sept. 1, 1944 Peleliu invasion date. However, Stinnett also notes that the reprimand required the photos to be tied up in the chain of command after Melvin and two higher-level officers had "signed off" on them while they were using a security-forbidden word uncensored, leading to Admiral Mitscher sending a letter of censure and reprimand which required that they re-access the photos and their reports and razor-blade out the forbidden word(s) ("Operation Snapshot"). This must have tied up the photos in question; thus, while Rupertus had the maps, he didn't have the comfirming photos from which Lt. Pasto had designed the maps and so couldn't be sure he could use them. Since the Melvin report was signed off on on July 31, and the reprimand in response by Mitscher was issued August 12, 1944, and since it took a few days to re-access the photos, and have each of the three commanders remove via razor blades their own 24 usages of the forbidden phrase, it is not hard to see how the confirming photos could have been unavailable until at least within short hours before the Marine landings on Peleliu--meaning Pasto's detailed maps couldn't be used by Rupertus going into the landings--more or less what Rupertus and others complained of. Intriguingly here, too, Stinnett quotes from Mitscher's courier of his reprimanding letter, then-Captain Arleigh A. Burke, Mitscher's Chief of Staff, who "hinted with tongue-in cheek that the indictment should have included George Bush. 'It's unfortunate we couldn't foresee the future achievements of our associates, and as a result there are thousands of interesting events not recorded.' (114)." Stinnett fails to catch the "double edge" to this comment. This is especially intriguing given the fact that Stinnett noted that Bush was the beginning point of the illegal usage of that phrase in his reports on the photos taken by Operation Snapshot. His use of the phrase helped goad his immediate commander Melvin and his superiors to begin using it also--so Burke's comment is absent the irony attempted, since only by a fluke was Bush exempted from this reprimand. 143--photo of Mierzejewski with Commander Melvin and Sam Melton. 157-61: Stinnett's now much-lauded and touted "refutation" of Chester Mierzejewski's assertion that "Bush's plane was not on fire" when he bailed out over Chi Chi Jima on Sept. 2, 1944. Of note is the fact that his main counter-witness, Joe Foshee, himself says "I did not see any fire, just smoke." Both Foshee and turret gunner Charles Bynum report, however, that Bush attempted to keep the plane level for several minutes, in order to allow his crew to bail out. This is intriguing, in that Bush has repeatedly said in several earlier accounts that he tried over and over on the intercom to get his crew to respond to his command to bail out and got no answer and also to Ski's claim that Bush told him in the Ready Room of the San Jac on his return that both crewmen were dead when he bailed out. This latter point, also, is refuted by the official accounts and the eyewitness reports that two parachutes were seen, Bush's and, apparently, White's, according to Bush in at least one earlier account. If Bush knew White was the one alive, if he had that much detail, how could he not have considered a water landing. The fact is, Joe Foshee's account, still from exactly the position Ski originally thought he was in, backs up Ski's in that the plane didn't seem to have been on fire. If the plane isn't on fire, according to Exec. Officer Legare Hole in interview with reporters (recorded by Tarpley and Chaitkin), you try to water land rather than bail out to maximize the crew's chance of survival. None of the current eyewitness accounts even backs up the official records of the time that Bush's plane was on fire. Interestingly, too, while Stinnett acknowledges the existence of Thomas Keene in a group photo with Bush, 164, he fails to note that Keene told Tarpley and Chaitkin he was "surprised to hear it: 'Did he say that?' he asked" when told Bush was then (1987-8) asserting on TV that his plane was "in flames" when he bailed out: Keene had met Bush on the Finnback and talked at some length about Bush's crash. Keene says Bush never mentioned anything about his plane being in flames at that time. In the October 1992 Sidney Blumenthal New Republic article subsequent to Stinnett's material (cited in my book), Ski said that Bush told him in the Ready Room that the two crewmen were dead when he bailed out.
Yet, in at least one earlier biography cited by Blumenthal's article, Bush is quoted as saying he and his other crewmen were maneuvering around in the plane to get their 'chutes ready--Blumenthal's point being that Bush's "War Story" [sic] has changed frequently over the years, mine being that he is attempting to cover up the fact that he didn't know how to water land an aircraft and may never have before, contrary to his version of events of June 19, 1944. 92-3; 199-203. It should be noted of Stinnett's detailed research that it took some time and that it came even after several earlier "official" biographies of Bush had attempted to grapple with a number of issues.
This, in itself, strongly argues the feasibility of a "politically true" scenario--that these things required detailed research and "long-winded" explanations not available to Bush in the closing weeks and days of the 1980 Presidential election. Stinnett also seems to be trying to answer several of the charges raised in the book ad, only a small part of which I can recall: the Peleliu photo material, for example, seems geared to answering the claim that Bush sometimes "flew high, avoiding contact with the Japanese"--in context, apparently, for diplomatic reasons in a certain time-frame. (That time-frame,based on my research, would have been the early June to early July time-frame, in which Allen Dulles was engaging in his activities and shortly after which Forrestal was seen by Marine Tom Devine on Saipan. Bush's high flights to take recon. pix are argued as being "valid"--yet I don't recall anyone else ever bringing this point up at any time. No one else ever questioned the validity of any of Bush's high flights. On balance, then, one can say of Stinnett's book what I earlier said of the official US military account: my scenarios come "through the fire" and emerge unscathed. One of the sources I've used briefly in researching Bush's wartime record was Blumenthal. His article "War Stories" which appeared in New Republic October 1992 issue, was clearly a pro-Clinton article--one which bought Blumethal a position in the Clinton Administration. His purpose in his research is not necessarily mine: to contrast Bush with Clinton, and find some corollary, some parallel, in an ironic way, between what he perceives to be Bush's poorly-thought-out bail-out over Chi Chi Jima and Clinton's anxious and clearly conscience-ridden avoidance of the draft during the Vietnam era.
Blumenthal does a fairly good job in this, but my data suggests that he has a needlessly limited perspective. Within the limits that he works, he shows that Bush's crewmen were doubtful of the wisdom of Bush's bailout.
Above all, though, it reveals that George Bush, though clearly moved to tears when he thinks of the deaths of his fellow crewmen in the War, is, in a somewhat emotionally-contracdictory mode, is also fully willing to blatantly lie about what happened that day. Blumenthal's article includes an interview he did with Chester Mierzejewski, Bush's squadron fellow, who is most well-known because he, along with Lawrence Mueller, Thomas Keene and Legar Hole, among others, has disputed Bush's various versions of events in WW2. Blumenthal says "Ski" told him that Bush met with him when back on board the San Jacinto after eight weeks on the USS Finnback (the sub that is seen picking him up in the famous film of him).
"Back in the ready room...he sought out Chester Mierzejewski, who had been
the tail-gunner on the plane just ahead of Bush's when it had been hit--the
man with the clearest view, only 100 feet away. Mierzejewski had been
particularly close to Delaney [one of the two crewmen killed on Bushs'
plane that day]. And Bush seemed to want to answer the agonizing unasked
questions: Why didn't he make a water landing? Why was he the only one to
jump? Did he panic? 'Look,' Mierzejewski told me Bush said to him, 'I'm
sure the two of them in the back were dead. I called them three times and got no answer.' "
Yet, in 1987, Bush has changed what he told "Ski." Watching Bush on DavidFrost on TV, "Ski" was startled:
"to hear the presidential candidate retell his war story, the one about
how the plane was 'in smoke and the wings were burning'; and how, of the
two crewmen, 'one of them got out. I think the other was killed in the
plane.'
"This is not what Bush had told Mierzejewski in the Ready Room."
"...And why, he wondered, was Bush talking about smoke and fire?
Mierzejewski had witnessed only a 'puff of smoke' after Bush's plane was
hit--not billows of smoke and flames, certainly no smoke in the cockpit."
"...Some of the other crewmen substantiated a number of his [Ski's]
details..."
Official biographies of Bush--as Tarpley and Chaitkin note--have repeatedly presented varying versions of this story. Perhaps it is only because Bush gets so emotional about all of this, that he distorts the memory: after all, the War was horrible, and all of does tend to run together in the mind. But Blumenthal's data base is too limited, and therefore, understandably, Bush's willingness to exploit this incident is too easily interpreted in that way.
I'm currently struggling through Blumenthal's little history re-write, Pledging Allegiance (NY: Harper-Collins, 1990). These kinds of semi-journalistics modern history rewrites intrigue me. There's clearly a whole genre here, often written by journalists who would be political appointees. In this case, Blumenthal takes liberties with history that I--supposedly making a more radical claim--wouldn't even think of taking. He inserts conversations that never really occured, creates scenes that never took place, puts words in people's mouths. He brings in all kinds ofweird perspectives (Gary Hart as an "anthropologist?"). It's been difficult for me to wade through, because it only looks at the surface, ignoring thedeeper, underlying causes of the events and real shapers of people going into events. He's clearly one of those homosexual-community-beloved modern journalists who can't bring themselves to critique that community or its borderline psychological characteristics and blatant, insultant lack of morality in any traditional sense--even as he flies in at the likes of Jim Bakker for sins no greater. Having attacked Bush repeatedly from the Right himself, he then posits himself as a "liberal" critic of Bakker and other (self-styled, of course) religionists ala "defending" this homosexual communities own immorality on the grounds that "Bakker does immoral things, too." This is very fashionable, of course, and very "easy" politically. I just can't seem to buy it, at least coming from this guy and his white-collar, got-it-too-easy-there-in-DC-press crowd. I don't care what his sexual "persuasion" is. At this point in time, the gay community is a little too sacrosanct. I can't stand it. I'm no neanderthal, and certainly don't fall as a "conservative" or a Jimmy Swaggert. I just can't stand this namby-pamby, dance-around-the-problem approach, though. Half the time, I haven't been able to STAND a good part of the gay men I've met or known as friends in my life. They tend--perhaps this is culturally reinforced--to be backstabbing, arrogant, self-pitying. Sorry--that's the truth. Some psychotherapists have theorized that both lesbianism and homosexuality are psychological aberrations, emotional disorders--similar to alcoholism and substance abuse, or I don't think I care much for this character, but I was able to use his article to some extent to establish some truths about this War that occured between 1939 and 1945, this second world war. He also gives some further insights into that vindictiveness of character that was noted by Tarpley and Chaitkin in connection with Haig's ouster by Bush. Repeatedly, without pointing it out, in this book Blumenthal points out events that really illustrate Bush's vindictive traits. Haig was the only "pro-Israel" Reagan Cabinet member. In the wake of Reagan's shooting, Bush and his pro-Iraq, pro-Arab, Big Oil crew, moved in against him. It's clear that there was friction between Haig and Bush. But Haig, says Tarpley and Chaitkin, chose not to prolong the fight. ("Haig knew Bush was vindictive.")
Blumenthal again confirms this trait of Bush's. Shortly after Clinton took office, Bush took up the issue addressed in Blumethal's article "War Story." He went after Blumenthal, filing lawsuits, etc., to get him out of the way. Generally, journalists can fight back in these kinds of lawsuits--Bush is a "public figure" under the law, so libel suits won't succeed. But Bush has kept on. His buddies in the broadcast media have kept on at Blumenthal. He had done the unspeakable. He had questioned Bush's wartime activities.
God--he'd really hate my guts! I think he may have committed treason in the War. I wonder how vindictive he might get with me? Is he who threatened General Russell S. Bowen, author of The Immaculate Deception (at least, in the version that is currently extant)? Someone did.
Well--he can get mad at me if he wants, but I don't think I cared for Mr. Hitler or his associates, including Hirohito, Tojo, etc. If he did have dealings with them, I don't think he's really all that entitled to wave the Flag in my face or accusing me of lack of masculinity or something because
I didn't volunteer to go to 'Nam. I was 1A, but they didn't call my number in the lottery. So--was I supposed to jump in anyway and go into Mr. Dulles's (remember him? The guy that did all this stuff in WW2?) war in Vietnam against Ho Chi Minh--someone who fought ON OUR SIDE in WW2?
Well--even at the time, both my dad and I thought there was something fishy about that idea. Perhaps Allen Dulles was "vindictive" too? Ho wasn't enough of a "buddy" of he and his Nazi-sympathizing compadres, perhaps? So--vindictive revenge.
My efforts to clarify the research keep producing new insights that add to the credibility of "the scenario."
Again, flashing back into Hyams's book Flight of the Avenger, in light of subsequent research, produces new perspective on things he says. Hyams's account of WHEN Bush took off on June 19, 1944, agrees with both Hoyt's and Crowl's accounts. As Hoyt has already noted, Hyams also notes:
"On the morning of June 19, before the task force aircraft had located the
enemy fleet, the Japanese struck with a force of 524 planes....While the
SAN JAC's figher planes scrambled to engage the horde of incoming aircraft,
Bush and other torpedo bomber pilots were ordered to take off to keep their
precious planes from being bombed on the deck. Nadeau recalls that Bush
taxied their Avenger to the catapult, where they were tied down. 'We needed
to be catapulted, instead of making a deck takeoff, because of our heavy
load of ordnance. Once we were tied down for the cat shot, a wave of
Japanese planes attacked the SAN JAC. We couldn't take off, however,
because the ship wasn't into the wind.'
"As the SAN JAC guns traded rounds with the enemy planes, Bush, Nadeau and
Delaney sat in their Avenger with the engine running, praying they wouldn't
get hit.
"Poised on the catapult ready for takeoff, Bush attuned his sense to the
sound of his engine. He listened intently to make certain it was running
properly, so that when he revved up he would have full throttle (power).
Something seemed wrong to him, and he looked down at his instruments and
discovered that he had little oil pressure. Bush signaled the launch
officer to abort the launch, but it was too late: the deck had to be
cleared. As the bomb-laden Avenger was catapulted into the air, the engine
sputtered.
"Bush flew for awhile and then realized the plane was in real trouble. He
flew back along the starboard side of the ship, the established method to
signal his need to make an emergency landing. But the deck officer, busy
launching planes, waved him off.
"Within minutes Bush came on the intercom and asked Nadeau if he had seen
something go by his turret.
"'Yes,' said Nadeau. "I saw a big black cloud of smoke on the starboard
side..'
"'We just lost all our oil,' Bush said. 'We're going to have to ditch.
Prepare for a water landing.'
"Bush could not use his radio to signal his situation, because the
squadron was under radio silence, so he made another fly-by on the
starboard side of the carrier from stern to bow, signaling that he was
going to put the plane down in the water.
"Any sea landing is hazardous because the pilot has to hit the crest of a
wave into the wind:if he doesn't hit just right, the plane can cartwheel.
This time his landing was even more perilous because the Avenger was
carrying FOUR FIVE-HUNDRED POUND DEPTH CHARGES [--my emphases--mcs]. There
wasn't time to jettison them, SO BUSH FLEW AHEAD OF THE FLEET [--my
emphases--mcs]...(Hyams 83)."
OK. I've got four five-hundred pound depth charges under my wings. I'm going to land on the water, I think--if I've got any other options!
On top of that: I've got four five houndred pound depth charges under my wings. I'm by now an experienced combat pilot. I've got a US fleet under me. It's steaming in a certain direction. Since I know that, if I ditch, these depth charges are going to be a possible hazard to those ships if they run up over them, I'm going to--what, fly ahead of the fleet? So they can run into them?
Wouldn't it make more sense, that I'd fly behind the fleet, in the opposite direction, to minimize the number of ships that might potentially run up over these depth charges from my ditched aircraft? Admittedly, I already know my plane will--can--only stay afloat for a few minutes--2-5 minutes, at the very longest. But the depth charges have a "life" of slightly longer than, say, a regular bomb, since they can float with the tide for a few yards, as well as sinking and exploding with depth. All in all, I'd want to fly backward, in the opposite direction of the fleet.
Yet, I'm flying toward Guam--ahead of the fleet.
While this wouldn't be responsible behavior for a pilot in this situation, it would work for a pilot who was heading for Guam and trying to get there ahead of the fleet.
Now--on another point: Joe Hyams "versus" Tarpley and Chaitkin. In The Unauthorized Biography of George Bush, note that airman Thomas Keene, who was also on the sub that Bush was on when he was picked up off Chi Chi Jima on --apparently--September 2, 1944-- says, when approached on the subject of whether Bush's plane was on fire that day, was "Surprised to hear it--'Did he say THAT?' he asked."
On the other hand, Hyams, (121), tells us:
"...Bush met the pilot, gunner and radioman from the USS Frankllin, rescued the previous day. Keene, who had also been flying an Avenger, told Bush how he had lost power from a hit, most probably in the hydraulic lines. Bush said that he'd had to abandon his plane because it was on fire [--emphasis added--mcs]."
A clear conflict with what Thomas Keene actually heard George Bush say.
As you may have noted in the manuscript--or hopefully will note after awhile, a couple of my chapters have titles like "'Amelia Earhart's Plane,'" and titles pertaining to Robert Maxwell and Alexander Haig, etc. These are pertaining to the ins and outs of various intelligence operatives.
David Bergamini notes that, after Saipan fell, Hirohito knew the cause was lost, but kept up the facade. Going into that loss of the Marianas, however, my research suggests a lot of diplomatic activity, as well as military, by Japan and its American friends in those weeks of June, 1944.
Sulh, Raghid. Britain's Two Wars with Iraq: 1941-1991. Reading, Berkshire: Ithaca, 1996.100-135; 162-5; 173-80; 187-8. Interesting data here on the activities, immediately post-1941 coup, of Ba'ath Party founders, including Saddam Hussein's uncle.
Thompson, Peter and Anthony Delano. Maxwell: A Portrait of Power. London: Corgi, 1988, 1991. 10; 14; 30-33; 106-7; 109; 115-16; 186-89; 213-19; 237-244. 31- 32: is noting that there was a legal battle between Maxwell and Harcourt, Brace, Jocanovich (HBJ), lead by the latter, to avoid Maxwell's buy-out of an American-based publisher. Intriguingly, after Maxwell was defeated by HBJ in his bid to buy it out in 1987, a year later, in 1988, HBJ was the publisher of Joe Hyams' "authorized" biography of George Bush: Flight of the Avenger: George Bush at War. Interesting timing: was hard-pressed HBJ at that time "awarded" by Bush and his White House staff for its impertinence with Maxwell? By way of contrast, recall that Reagan, during this same time, was, like Jimmy Carter, being photographed with Maxwll, and was "rewarding" him with work on the "American Good Impression" committee, even though he was a British citizen. Thompson/Delano also note that Maxwell's conglomerate Pergamon Press/British Printing and Communications Company, attempted in January 1988 (going into Bush's first Presidential election bid and after Maxwell had met with Reagan in 1987) to buy out the New York Post, then owned by Rupert Murdoch and associates. He was unable to convince Murdoch to sell him any publicly-acknowledged shares, though it's interesting to note (214-215) that Maxwell's empire has sizable hidden financial holdings in Leichtenstein, a nation even more secretive than Switzerland as to "bank accounts."
Interestingly, too, after Ted Kennedy's manipulation in the Senate of 1988, (Ted's father, Joseph, Sr., as US Ambassador to Brtain in 1939-40, had helped arm Hitler)Maxwell was discouraged from any further publicized attempts to buy out said paper; yet, in August 1988, the New York Post ran the article "The Day Bush Bailed Out" which quoted "Ski" contesting Bush's version of events over Chi Chi Jima, which is referred to here in my book in several places. This is the article which first raised the question before the public: "why didn't Bush water land instead of bailing out?"
*United States Army. Far East Command, Historical Section. "Interrogations of Japanese Officials on World War II." 2 vols. Mimeographed.
*-----------------. "Statements of Japanese Officials on World War II." 4 vols. Mimegraphed. National Archives microfilm no. 8-5.1 AD 4; page references in Notes are to this microfilm.
*--------------. "Translations of Japanese Documents." 3 vols. Mimeographed. National Archives microfilm 8-5.1; page references in Notes are to the pagination to this microfilm.
*United States Army Forces Far East. Numbered mimeographed "Japanese monographs" distributed by Department of the Army, Office of Miltary History, 1952-1956. c., and d.) Nos. 71-72: "Army Operations in China, December 1941-December 1943" and "Army Operations in China, Jauary 1944-August 1945."
United States Congress. House. Joint Report of Task Force to Investigate Certain Allegations Concerning Holding of American Hostages by Iran in 1980. Washington, DC: GPO, Jan. 3, 1993. Notes that it is impossible to determine the length and breadth of Reagan/Bush Administration hostages and arms dealings with Iran due to the shredding operation of November 1986.
United States Congress. Senate. The "October Surprise" Allegations and Circumstances Surrounding the Release of Hostages Held in Iran: Report of the Special Counsel. Washington, DC: GPO, Nov. 19, 1992. 36; 90-1; 93-9; 102;103-5; 114-21, ("Conclusions", esp. 120: 4; 120-1: 5); Appendix: 263-4: 14; 304: 27 (W. Casey's Amex receipt for 10/18/80), and 305: 28 (W. Casey's Amex receipt for 10/20/80: of possible significance is the absence of a Casey Amex receipt for 10/19/80). States in conclusion that "The great weight of the evidence is that there was no such deal, (115) but that "...numerous witnesses have testified that it was entirely within Casey's character and capabilities to embark on an 'extracurricula' hostage mission. Casey's O.S.S. background and his penchant for going outside normal channels are matters of record. His likely involvement in the Iran-Contra and "Debategate" scandals suggest a man strongly committed to the proposition that the ends justify the means.
"An evaluation of Casey's involvement in the hostage crisis is influenced by whether or not he met with the Karrubis in Madrid. This question has proven to be the most difficult of the investigation...(115-16)." (It goes on to absolve Casey of proven guilt.) However, a number of interesting bits and pieces are noted, (117-18):
"The evidence indicates that at least McFarlane knew in advance of the [L'Enfant Plaza] meeting that the hostage issue would be involved. [Rhet] Dawson stated stated that the man contacted [Senator John] Tower's office interested in talking about the hostages and stressing his ties to Khomeini. The sensitivity to the subject is apparent in Allen's bringing [attorney Lawrence] Silberman, a former Deputy Attorney General, along as a witness, and the choice of meeting in a hotel lobby several miles from Allen's downtown office. Even if the emissary made no mention before the meeting as to the subject matter, it it was clear he claimed to have Iranian conections and was interested in at least "US-Iran" relations. That topic, in September, 1980, inevitably included the hostages.
"Silberman and [Richard V.] Allen are credible in asserting that they told the emissary that the Carter Administration had jurisdiction over the conduct ofthe hostage crisis. There is no evidence that any of the Americans had any further dealings with the emissary or that any formal understanding was reached. But Allen's own memorandum suggests that the meeting was not intended necessarily as the last word: Allen wrote, 'Both Larry and I indicated that we would be pleased to hear whatever additional news Mr. Mohammed might be able to turn up, and I suggest that the information be communicated via a secure channel.' The tone of the memorandum does not correspond to testimony by all of the participants that the emissary was dismissed summarily...[And] they were operating on the outer limits of propriety, considering their status as private citizens without authority to interfere in the conduct of the foreign relations of the United States. (117-18)." On 120, the Report notes that "there is more to be done," and that.
"A review of the Hashemi electronic surveillance must be completed. About 150 reel-to-reel tapes have not yet been reviewed. In particular, the November-December 1980 intercepts should be reviewed with care. Just as time ran out for this investigation, Special Counsel had developed evidence that there may be been significant meetings in London and Paris in November 1980 involving Cyrus Hashemi, arms, hostages, and post-election hostages/arms meetings between Reagan operatives and Iranians or their emissaries. Such meetings would have had as their objective a solution to the hostage crisis prior to the Reagan Administration's coming into office. The propriety of such meetings during a transition period is debatable; all would agree that such contact would be qualitatively different than contact prior to the election [such as the aformentioned Madrid, Paris or L'Enfant Plaza meetings--mcs] (120)."
An interesting link not often investigated by researchers, Congressional and otherwise, in this area, is the idea that Israel was not deeply involved, that the arms in question were promised by Far Right forces in Europe and the Middle East, including P-2, whose personnel the Iranians were also holding hostage. This point is briefly touched on by Barbara Honneggar, who, however, chooses to go back to "blaming Israel" for the arms brokering.
The focus on Israel was always a red herring. Robert Maxwell, the only Jew involved (in 1980 not an "acknowledged" Jew), was probably active during the transition period in arranging bribes for the KGB-funded Palestinians, via his KGB-USSR ties in publishing. Key to Maxwell's involvement was the involvement of P-2 and Bush's help to Saddam's Iraq. Maxwell sought to soften Bush's pro-Iraq position. In the event, he caused Bush to adopt the strategy of Saddam as the "stick" to P-2's "carrot" of a Muslim arms deal.
Most arms promised were clearly not delivered, between Haig's being "on the outs" with Bush and Bush's determination to side with Iraq in the Iran-Iraq conflict, which he'd probably goaded Saddam to start in August and September 1980, through his family's 1941 and his personal January 1977 ties to Saddam's family and Ba'ath party--ties that he probably also saw were presented to the Iranians. That influenced their basic decision of August-November of 1980 not to release the hostages before the US election was over, then to release them at a "neutral" time between administrations, so that no President could claim credit.
Maxwell's bribes of the Palestinians, however, delayed the hostage release until after Reagan's inauguration. He did so in completion of his deal with Bush and P-2 to not publish "the first edition of the Immaculate Deception, " so that those parties would (1) get Haig- accessed NATO arms to Iran out of Germany (arms that weren't delivered); and (2) back off from supplying Iraq with nuclear weapons--which was understood as Bush's position.
By June, Israel knew the promised arms weren't going to Iran. It simultaneously concluded Bush's passivity in the face of Iraq's growing nuclear threat. That lead Israel to bomb the Osirak reactor that month. No actual Israeli arms were ever involved in the "October surprise" and the only Jew involved in ANY of it was Robert Maxwell. Haig resigned when he learned he couldn't "keep his word" to the Iranians in following up on the NATO reforger stores requistions he'd shown them via Donald Gregg.
Loftus and Aarons are not far wrong in asserting no Israeli involvement in the "October surprise" and that even Israel's alleged involvement in Iran-Contra was largely a "set up" by Bush to blame Israel for the whole "shibang." Where researchers have gone wrong, as stated earlier, has always been in looking for Israelis. The arms dealers in question were on the Far Right, (as represented by players such as Big Oil and German industrial interests), not Israelis. The Far Right played on its common appeal in both Iraq and Iran as to its "anti-British" history. This, in turn, was cynically manipulated by MI-6 in Britain itself, with whom Casey had "ancient" ties.
The Far Right determined that Ba'ath, with its living connection to Vichy agents in Syria of WW2, was the last living wing of the Nazi party. Though Khomeini had criticized the "old Shah" during the War, he had, in the end, been strangely silent about the joint British-Soviet occupation of Iran of 1941--the threat of the repeat of which was another ploy Bush used in dealing with Khomeini, as he pointed (through "go-betweens") to how
Standard Oil personnel had sought to help Iran "go its own way" from Britain in June-August, 1941. (Based on Foreign Affairs from 1941.)
Just that, without any talk about arms, would have gotten Bush's "foot in the door" with Khomeini. He could then merely point to his equally "legitimate" (that is, anti-Britiish) ties to Saddam's Ba'ath Party, going all the way back to the Raschid Ali coup of April-May 1941. Bush and his family--and Standard Oil--were, ironically, one of the few in the world that had befriended "both sides" of the Iran-Iraq War, back in 1941.
Vankin, Jonathan, and John Whalen. The Seventy Greatest Conspiracies of All Time: History's Biggest Mysteries, Cover-ups and Cabals. Secaucus, NJ: Citadel, 1998.
Chapter 34: "Potshots From the 'Bushy Knoll'?". 505-9. 505: NBC Special reports on the day Reagan was shot: Judy Woodruff reported seeing a man shooting from the upper windows above the street where the scuffle with Hinckley occurred. Personally recalled: Data on info. to journalist Judy Woodruff from on-the-scene persons of having seen person(s) in upper window(s) of hotel in front of which Reagan was shot and where Hinckley was wrestled down. Person(s) were said to be armed with rifle(s). My personal recollection is that there was some speculation afterward that these were Secret Service personnel, who were heavily armed on the scene. Also comments that the limousine door was apparently between Reagan and Hinckley at least part of the time.
506: Hinckley met with top members of the American Nazi Party in Nebraska the day before he flew to Nashville to stalk Carter and where he was subsequently arrested with three guns at airport. Apparently from On Being Mad or Merely Angry: John W. Hinckley, jr., and Other Dangerous People. Princeton, NJ: UP, 1990. No page no's are cited in 70 Greatest's references here.
508-10: reference to data compiled by Gaeston Fonzi in his book The Last Investiga
tion. (NY: Thunder's Mouth, 1990), pertaining to GHW Bush's links to CIA earlier than he has admitted, including a possibly "suspicious" death allegedly in cover-up.